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INTRODUCTION

The

of the judicial process to the

centrality

stability

of society implies the

importance of what goes on in courts. Courts are not omnipotent oracles dispensing
justice

according to their

whims and

substantive and procedural law.

The

They

caprices.

are guided

by

rules,

both of

quality of justice obtainable in the courts,

and

consequently the credibility of the judicial process, depends on the nature of these rules.

On

the procedural side,

which regulate what
before

it.

evidence.

facts

The hearsay

An

rule

one

old principle having

endure heavy criticisms.

may

the court
is

It

is

many jurisdictions have

receive in the adjustment of disputes brought

of such

a

still

rules. It is essentially

roots in the

its

detailed rules of evidence

feature

common

one of exclusion of

law, the rule continues to

of the evidentiary process of

many

jurisdictions.

The purpose of

this

work

United States and in Nigeria. Both are
legal

system

rule as

it

is

more advanced than

work

to

examine the application of the

common law

the latter' s.

applies in both jurisdictions

Nigeria. Similarly the

is

It is

countries.

rule in the

However, the former's

thus thought that a comparison of the

would inform, and

help, current reform efforts in

will be a ready source of education

on

this aspect

of

evidence.
It is

divided into four chapters. The

first

examines the meaning of hearsay

and the rule against hearsay evidence. The second chapter explores the theoretical and
practical justifications

exceptions to

for the

exclusion of hearsay evidence. There are numerous

the rule precluding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Chapters

and four are devoted

to

some of these

exceptions.

A conclusion follows.

three

Unlike Nigeria's federalism, the component states

have autonomous legal systems. Each
exist the Federal Rules

work concentrates on

of Evidence.

state

Most

has

its

states

own

in the

United States

rules of evidence.

There also

have adopted the Federal Rules. The

the Federal Rules of Evidence

which

are used as a

model

United States. In some instances the comparison between the two jurisdictions
within the text of particular

of the respective positions

titles

is

or subtitles. In others, separate examinations are

in the jurisdictions.

for the

made
made

CHAPTER

I

DEFINITION
A.

What

is

AND STATEMENT OF THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE

Hearsay Evidence
It

evidence.

Some may

practitioners

confront

it.

much of

may

?

appear a

little

doctrinaire to focus

on the meaning of hearsay

argue that even without a conceptual definition of the subject,

and judges, who grapple with

it,

can recognize hearsay evidence

they

Yet, as the avalanche of literature on the subject, and plethora of cases, show,
perplexity

the

involved

regime

the

in

of hearsay

characterization or non-characterization of evidence as hearsay.

make

when

hairsplitting distinctions as to

derives

from

the

Indeed, judges often

whether a piece of evidence

is

hearsay or non-

hearsay.

Consistent with the confusing
as controversial as

is

is

all

that

aspects of

all

forms the basis for

So entrenched

is

This

unattainable."'

suggested that hearsay pervades

removed."'

of

aspects of hearsay,

the direction of reform of the rule. Professor

"a perfect hearsay definition

one type of hearsay

lot

life

all

is

its

Roger Park

not surprising, after

and

definition

is

asserts that

all it

has been

that "implicit in all testimony is

of our perceptions and that cannot be

hearsay in our quotidian existence that a commentator

suggests that "the rule treating hearsay as presumptively inadmissable

hearsay would be epistemologically suicidal."^

Sure hearsay

may

if

applied to

all

feature in our daily

Roger C. Park, I Didn 't Tell Them anything About You: Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783,794
(1990)

Mary Morton, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide, 74 Geo. L.J. 1301
(1986); Charles T. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute,

20 Tex. L. Rev.66 1 67 1

Mary Morton,

,

supra note 2,

at

(1

1305

942)

of the

lives but in the context

litigation process, different and,

come

important considerations

As Moorehead

into play.

some would

life in

three significant respects."^

maker, usually a person, has a
trier

of

Secondly, the outcome of a

has a corporate nature which

trial in

may

and the possibility of an un-rectifiable mistake.

system

may

be

in personal matters,

it

may

only be

Not so

at the cost

miscarriage of justice which strikes

As a
activities,

it

is

result,

important,

special treatment. This

hearsay.^

However,

wrong decisions

And

at the

of penalty

integrity

of the

One may add

that

or indeed to suffer such

for a "corporate" judicial system.

of tortuous appeals.

far

Correction, if

such mistake

may

occasion

very root of society.

notwithstanding the prevalence of hearsay in every day

when

much

The very

based on questionable hearsay.

easier to correct

is

mistakes with equanimity.
available,

is

more

Thirdly, in the litigation

result in the imposition

state

a decision

to ascribe reliability or

a court setting has

by the

at stake if

its

the circumstances than does the

reaching implications than do private or personal decisions.
setting, the decision

from

ordinary setting the decision

These information enable him

facts in a court setting.

unreliability to hearsay.

First, in the

more information on

lot

of

rightly argues, "regardless

the magnitude of the nonjudicial decision... the use of hearsay in court differs

use in daily

more

say,"

is

it

comes

to the trial process, to isolate the

concept for

conceded even by the proponents of the pervasiveness of

this overlap bedevils the definition

of hearsay which

is

as varied as

scholars on the subject.

See James D. Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy o/Res
Gestae Reliability, 29 Loy. L.A.L. Rev 203, 224 (1995); Christopher B. Mueller,
Post Modern Hearsay: The Importance of Complexity, 76 Minn. L. Rev 367 383-

384(1992)
Moorehead, supra note

4,

Mary Morton recognizes

223

-

224

the need for this distinction.

between implicit hearsay and

Thus she distinguishes

explicit hearsay, the latter being the

commentators. See Mary Morton, supra note 2

at

1306

concern of legal

The hearsay concept arose

common law

concepts,

experience

came

An

conceptualization

later.

and

as

of

part

practice

common

were

first,

eminent scholar, and one of the

law.^

And

while

most

like

analysis

earliest writers

and

on the

subject of evidence, Stephens, formulated the hearsay rule thus:

A

statement oral or written

made otherwise than by

a witness in giving

evidence, and statement contained or recorded in any book, document or

record whatever, proof of which

deemed

to

is

not admitted on other grounds, are

be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter

stated.^

The

editor of Phipson's

Law of Evidence

made by persons who

statements

perceives the matter this way: "oral or written

are not parties

and are not called as witnesses are

inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter stated"

law writer

criticizes

would tend

'^.

A

more contemporary common

both definitions. Sir Rupert Cross argues that Stephen's formulation

to regard a witness' narration

of his out of court statement as hearsay. '°

He

contends that this will be wrong since where a witness repeats his out of court statement,

show consistency and

not for the truth of the statement.

it is

usually to

two

criticisms against Phipson's definition.

party's reported statement and to

rightly levels

would seem

to

exclude a

remove admissions and confessions from the purview of

hearsay. Secondly, the expression "persons
that the repetition,

First, the definition

He

who

are not called as witnesses"

may

suggest

by one witness, of an out of court statement of another witness would

For a brief description of the development of the concept see Edmund Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
177, 179(1948)

10

DIGEST OF

LAW OF EVIDENCE, Art

15

PHIPSON'S

LAW OF EVIDENCE, 271

(10th ed)

RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE, 490

(1970)

not be hearsay.

This cannot be so. In defining hearsay,

Morgan seems

to

emphasize

its

dangers. Thus he states that:

Analytically, an utterance offered for a purpose

making

As

will be

it,

shown

such evidence.

subject to

later,

Such

all

which requires Trier

hearsay unless the uterrer was,

treat the utterer as a witness is

conditions prescribed for witnesses."

the principal concern about hearsay
unreliability

arises

from the

is

the seeming unreliability of

fact that

the normal

prescribed for witnesses are usually lacking in the case of hearsay. Yet

misleading to view hearsay only as evidence or statements

is

it is

conditions

conceptually

made otherwise than under

For instance, evidence given

prescribed conditions for witnesses.

proceeding which

to

when

in a

previous judicial

tendered in a subsequent proceeding will be hearsay.

And

this will

be so notwithstanding that in the previous proceeding the normal conditions prescribed
for witnesses obtained. In this respect

These

Morgan's definition

illustrate the difficulty associated

with defining a concept as controversial as hearsay.
defining hearsay,

how have

legislatures faired?

We

will appear a

little restrictive.

with definitions generally and
If scholars

have had problems

shall consider the statutory definition

of the concept in the two jurisdictions, United States and Nigeria. The Federal Rules of

Evidence

some

is

states

taken as paradigmatic of the United States position.

have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Edmund Morgan, supra

note

7, at

1

79

It is

also realized that

i.

Definition

Under

the Federal Rules of Evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence attempt a
hearsay.

In doing so

it

also specifically provides for statements

considered as hearsay. This thorough scheme

(a) Statement.

A

fairly

"statement"

is

is

detailed definition of

which would not be

enacted by Rule 801 which states:

an oral or written assertion or (2)
it is intended by the person as an

(1)

nonverbal conduct of a person,

if

assertion.
(b) Declarant.
(c)

Hearsay.

A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
"Hearsay"

is

a statement, other than one

declarant while testifying at the

trial

made by

the

or hearing, offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.

It

has been suggested that the objective of the Federal Rules of Evidence

down

the hearsay concept to something

Yet others,

like

much narrower

than

its

is to

common law

whittle

original.'^

Weissenberger, believe that "a central problem of the hearsay system,

not the singular problem of greatest magnitude,

is

that the evolution

of the

common

if

law

has given contemporary evidence law an excessively dense and overburdened hearsay
definition."'^

Given the

jurisprudence,

it is

fact that

common law

suggested that whilst

evidence a clean break with

it is

common law

is

is

modem

the progenitor of

desirable to continually improve

evidence

on

rules of

hardly realistic. Nonetheless, as subsequent

discussion will reveal, the Federal Rules of Evidence do depart from

common law

in

important respects.

A

close analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence definition reveals that

for evidence to be characterized as hearsay

'^

Olin

Guy Wellborn

III,

it

must be

The Definition of Hearsay

in the

Federal Rules of

Evidence, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1982)
'^

Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 Ohio
1525, 1533(1996)

St. L.J.

8

(i)

a statement;

made by

(ii)

(iii)

On

a person other than while testifying at the

or hearing; and

trial

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
the surface, this analysis appears straightforward, but the determination of the content

of each ingredient of the definition does present confusion and disagreement.
(a)

Statement

The Rules adopt
qualify as statement

it

must be an

a restrictive
assertion.

meaning of statement. For evidence

The

may be

assertion

oral or written.

It

to

may

also be nonverbal conduct provided the actor intended such conduct to be an assertion.

Unfortunately the word "assertion," which
statement,

is

not defined.

is

dispositive of whether evidence

exist

will so qualify. This

a

Certainly declarations and expressions of fact or opinion will

qualify as assertions and therefore statements under the

However doubts

is

whether other verbal expressions

problem collapses

into the fate

limb of Rule 801(a).

first

and exclamations

like questions

of conduct as statements.

Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules,

common law

prevailed and the

hearsay rule applied to verbal statements and also to conduct. This expansive application

of the rule found expression in the celebrated English case of Wright

v.

Tatham}^ The

action involved the challenge of a will on the ground that the testator did not have corpus
mentis.

The evidence

letters that

offered by the defendant, propounder of the will, included several

had been written

to the testator

by persons who had since then died. Although

the letters did not directly assert the mental competence of the testator, the defendant,

propounder, offered them

all

as relevant

beliefs of the authors that the testator

on the theory

that their tenor

was competent because they addressed him

would address a normal person. The Exchequer Chamber and
the letters to be hearsay and therefore inadmissable. In the

"

the

as one

House of Lords held

words of Baron Parke:

7A.&E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 Exch. Ch.l837 aff d 5C.
559 (H.L 1838)

and content implied

& F.

670, 7 Eng.

Rep

Proof of a particular

fact,

which

is

not of itself a matter in issue, but which

relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person in the

is

mater in

issue, is inadmissable in all cases

where such a statement or

opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible..."

As

always, hearsay questions dove

statement

is classic, it

were not

that they

appears that the

letters

could also have been rejected on the ground

relevant.'^ Unfortunately, the interface

does not seem to receive extensive

attention.'^

the hearsay field has been explored.
five categories of evidence

Whilst Baron Parke's

into relevancy issues.

tail

On

between hearsay and relevancy

the other

hand the extensive scope of

Indeed the Advisory Committee's Note alludes to

which have been

treated as hearsay at

common

law.'^

These

are (1) verbal assertions (2) assertive nonverbal conduct (3) nonassertive nonverbal

conduct

(4) nonassertive verbal

conduct (5) assertive verbal conducts offered as basis for

inferring something other than the matter asserted.

The Federal Rules of Evidence discriminate among these
Evidence

in categories (1)

Id at 388-89,
16

This

is

1

and

12 Eng.

(2) are characterized as statement

Rep

at

and therefore can be

516

because they indirectly border on the opinion of the authors. There was no

suggestion that the authors were medical experts and
sanity

categories.

is

it

is

doubtful if the issue of

a matter on which lay opinion can be received. However,

that the letters

it is

arguable

were circumstantial evidence. The definition of "Relevant

Evidence" under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

is

wide enough

to

cover circumstantial evidence.
17

But see G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About
Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. Rev. 1,14 (1993) (suggesting that every hearsay problem
can be recast into a Rule 401/403 problem); Olin Guy Wellborn III, supra note 12
at 62 (suggesting that all hearsay evidence could be viewed as a kind of
circumstantial evidence, and that

all

hearsay risk could, in that view, be

transmogrified into mere questions of weight.)
18

Wellborn

III,

supra note 12

at 51

10

For categories

hearsay.

would not present
perception.

On

risks. "°

(3), (4),

(5), the

Advisory Committee considered that they

the usual hearsay dangers'^ of insincerity,
it

the other

hand

faulty, is not

mis-communication or

was thought they could be admitted without any, or

Therefore

illuminating article, Olin

which was

and

it

has been contended that this claim

Guy Wellborn

is

at

faulty

reduced,
In an

untenable.

argues that an antecedent perception or memory,

cured by the manner in which the non witness

may

subsequently

demonstrate such perception or memory."' Furthermore, he notes that the danger of mis-

communication

is

more pronounced with conduct than with

oral expressions.^'

On

the

danger of insincerity. Wellborn rejects the notion that because the out of court actor has

no

intent to

communicate by

his conduct, he

would not

intentionally mislead.^^

Either side of the divide has considerable merit although

how

difficult to

imagine

conduct

be an assertion.

to

a person

tidy logical balance

urge an expansive and

would have the
it is

all

is

would be

intentionally mislead unless he intended

his

Given the considerable tension between statements and

circumstantial evidence there

Such a

would

it

need to maintain a delicate balance between the two.

is

not very easy. Yet Rule 801 appears a fair compromise.

inclusive definition of statement, and

effect of legislating circumstantial evidence out

merely implied by Rule 40 1

.

By making

To

by extension hearsay,

of existence especially as

the intention of the actor the focal point, in

the determination of whether conduct should be treated as a statement, the Federal Rules

19

20

See Infra Chapter 2

See Wellborn

III,

also Maguire, The

supra note 12

at

93 citing several support for that view. See

Hearsay System: Around and Through the

Ticket, 14

Vand. L.

Rev. 741 (1961); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 Yale L.J. 489
(1930); United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (ED KY 1980)
21

'2

23

See Wellborn, supra note 12
Id at 62

Id

at

61

11

of Evidence indirectly preserve circumstantial evidence.
evidence has

own

its

Like hearsay, circumstantial

Thus, the requirement of the caution, in some

dangers.

that circumstantial evidence, to be acted upon,

jurisdictions,^''

must admit of no other

conclusion or inference.

When

Seldom does

the maker.
result

it

evidence

as a statement.

On

a statement, enquiry usually shifts to the credibility of

meaning intended by the maker engage much

the

would be unreliable

is

the other hand, by excluding such conduct

statement, and consequently rendering

The

trier

of

it

from the purview of

admissible, no greater danger

make

would belong

to the trier

occasioned.

is

all

things being equal he

would take

account other circumstances of the case, before drawing the necessary inference.
case of a conduct treated as statement, the inference
It is

and

in

some

conceded

is

imputed

that such thin distinctions

instances hard cases.

Zenni^^ and United States

v.

The

latter

may sometimes

may be

Lewis?^ In Zenni,

callers stated directions for the placing

into

In the

to the actor.

illustrated

lead to confusion

by United States

v.

government agents answered the

telephone several times while searching the premises of the defendant. The

24

and

In any event the

the correct inference.

And

of facts.

a

assertion,

facts instinctively realizes that this is a matter calling for inference

therefore requiring caution, so as to

inference

which the actor does not intend as

to treat conduct,

As

attention.

unknown

of bets on various sporting events. The defendant

RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, CASES AND

Example Texas, See

AND EDWARD

J.

MATERIALS, 200 (3RD
25

492

26

902

F.

Supp. 464 (ED

KY

ed. 1991)

1980)

F. 2d 1 176, 1 179 (5th Cir.1990); See also United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d
205 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Oguns, 921 F. 2d 442, 448-2, 449 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Long905 F. 2d 1, 1572, 1579-1580 (D.C. Cir. 1990);

United States

v.

Southard, 700 F. 2d

823; United States

379 U.S. 839

v.

Pasha, 332

F.

1,

13 (1st Cir. 1983) cert, denied

2d 193, 196-197 (7th

Cir.

1964)

463 U.S.

cert,

denied

12

objected to the admissibility of the utterances of the betters telephoning in their bets, but
the court held that the uttrances were

non

assertive verbal conducts

hearsay under Rule 801. They were thus admissible. In Lewis

and therefore not

was

the issue

the

admissibility of questions asked by unidentified callers. Appellants had electronic pagers
at the

time of thier

number displayed on

officer called the

Lewis. The person
in the affirmative.

that

at the other

Then

"Dog" was not

On

the

pager.

The

officer identified himself to be

end asked, "Did you get the stuff?" The officer answered

the person asked

available.

of the other appellant.
caller, the

Later the pager associated with Lewis beeped and the police

arrest.

At the

"where

trial,

is

Dog?",

to

which the

evidence revealed that

officer

Dog was

the admissibility of the questions asked

the

responded

nickname

by the unidentified

Court held that those questions did not qualify as statements under Rule 801

and were therefore incapable of being hearsay. They were consequently admissible

Even though on

the face of the decisions,

the defendants

may

}''

appear to

have been prejudiced by the indirect "assertions" of the unidentified callers suggesting
that bets

were placed on the defendant's premises

defendants received drugs (in the case of Lewis), can
or other trier of facts

,

should not

know of the

(in the case

it

of Zenni) and that the

seriously be argued that the jury

circumstances of those calls?

A

,

prudent

jury would then proceed cautiously being clearly conscious of the fact that the callers had

not ascribed any particular meaning to their questions. Suppose that the unidentified
callers

27

had made

direct assertions,

any

trier

of facts would naturally dwell on the

Cir. 1981) (treating non assertive
non hearsay); United States v Snow. 517 F.2d 441 (9th

See also United States v Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th
verbal conduct as
Cir.

1975) (treating an inscription in a briefcase as circumstantial evidence, not

intended as assertion, and therefore admissible)but contrast United States v Paceli,

108 (2nd Cir.) Cert. Denied,419 U.S. 826 (1974); Park v Huff, 493
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974); Krulewitch v United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Teper

491 F.2d

1

V Queen, (1952) A.C. 480 (P.C.) (which treated implied assertions as hearsay)

13

of those

credibility

callers.

Thus, there should be a conceptual distinction between the

two scenarios. Rule 801(a) maintains

(b)

that balance,

The Statement must be made by

even

if

it is

a delicate one.

a person other than while testifying at the trial

Consistent with the rationale for the hearsay rule, for a statement to qualify
as hearsay

The

it

must be made outside of the proceeding

typical situation

However

practical

declarant

is

is

where a witness

in

which

repeats, in court,

it is

what someone

which

his out

scenarios are imaginable. Suppose a witness. A,

of court statement

offered, in the case, through

proceeding in which

it

offered.

A

Two
told

previously made,

is

A himself.

Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
first

is

what another witness, B,

asserts

him. That will be hearsay. Suppose also that a statement, which

The

else told him.

and analytical problems attend a situation where the out of court

a witness in the case in

this respect.^*

offered in evidence.

view held

two views strove

that in so far as the statement

was tendered

as evidence,

it

was

for mastery in

was not made

in the

to be considered as hearsay."^

Therefore other things being equal, such statement was inadmissible.

A

contrary view^°

took the position that since the out of court declarant was available, and indeed a witness
in the proceeding, the underlying dangers,

which necessitate the hearsay

rule,

disappear

thus eliminating the need to treat the out of court statement as hearsay. However,

PAUL R ROSTHEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,322 (2nd ed 1979); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE S. 801, 190- 202 (4th ED 1996);
RONALD J. ALLEN AND RICHARD B. KUHNS, 1991 FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, 123 (1991); IRVING YOUNGER. HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET, 48 (1988)

''

See

^^

This view was represented by United States v Biener, 52 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa 1943).

See also People v Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441

P.

2d

1 1 1

,

68 Cal. Repr 599

(1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969)
'°

3 A.

J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

S 1018 996;

CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND
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proponents of the

first

sufficient guarantee.

view would counter

They contend

that

that the presence

even though the declarant

of the

declarant

may be

is

cross examined,

the fact that the opportunity to cross examine did not exist at the time the statement

made diminishes
appear to

make

the efficacy of such cross examination.^'

not

was

The Federal Rules of Evidence

a compromise between these two competing views.

It

states in rule 801

(d)(1) that:

A statement is not hearsay if
by witness

(1) Prior statement

-

The declarant

testifies at the trial

hearing and subject to cross examination concerning the statement and

or

is

(A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a
in a deposition, or (B) consistent

trial,

hearing, or other preceeding, or

with the declarant's testimony and

is

offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent

or

fabrication

improper influence or motive,

identification of a person

The

effect

made

of the above provisions

or

(C)

is

that certain prior statements

of a witness are

admissible having been expressly precluded from the hearsay definition.

proponents of the

liberal

one of

after perceiving the person.

(second) view.

However

This assuages

the rule prescribes conditions under

which these would be admissible:
1

2.

The out of court declarant must be
The statement must

fall

available for cross examination.

under any of three categories contained in the Rule

ie

it

must

be proir inconsistent statement made under oath or prior statement consistent with the
witness' present testimony and offered to rebut an express or implied charge, against the
declarant,

of recent fabrication, improper influence or motive, or a statement of

identification.

"

ROTHSTEIN,

supra note 28;

note 24 at 581 citing

CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND KIONKA,

Comer

supra

v State, 111 Ark. 156, 257 S.W. 2d 565 (1953)
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The

All other prior statements appear excluded.

three classes of prior

statements are indeed exceptional in the sense of their high relevancy.

of a witness' present testimony

truth

know

that the

a statement

"given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
or in a deposition"

suspect.

is

made

statement was

is

can be

evidence."
solely

no more

made under

A more
(d)

present

It is

at

a

trial,

To

hearing, or other proceeding,

extent, the evidence

that

is

reliable than that

fundamental issue

Many

put.

doubtful

^^

oath and in the circumstances described in the rule.

if

is

the use to

which statements covered by Rule

writers assert that they can be admitted as substantive

by "substantive evidence"

it is

meant

that the court

can rely

on the prior statement of the witness. Suppose a witness who had previously made

made under

oath can constitute positive evidence of the facts in issue.

recants.^'*

The absurdity of the
F.2d 1359 (5th

Cir.

It is

arguable that the witness' prior inconsistent statement

limitation

was brought out

in

United States

Allusion

v.

may

be

Palacios, 556

1977) where a witness' prior inconsistent statement, which

was signed was not admitted, not having been made on

oath.

CARLSON, IMWINKERLRIED AND KIONKA, supra note 24 at 583;
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE,
S 8.24

at

862-863 (1995) (suggesting factors that court should consider

determination of sufficieny of such statements);

Mccormick on evidence,

S.

251,

l

Ga. 858, 286 S.E. 2d 717 (1982) and State

63 (1982)
34

who had

of a witness whose prior inconsistent

now

33

the assessment of

of a witness

a statement,

32

to those

a statement inconsistent with his present testimony, but not under oath

or in a formal setting,

801

inconsistent with his

The gravamen of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)

the credibility of the witness.

previously

facts to

However, the limitation of the admissibility of such statements

testimony.

the

of

will be highly relevant for the trier

it

made

witness had earlier

To determine

cert.

As happened
States

V.

Denied 460 U.S.

in

United State

v.

1

18 (I992) citing Gibbons
v.

in the

JOHN WILLIAM STRONG
V.

State,

(ed),

248

Copeland, 278 S.C. 572,300 S.E. 2d

103 rehearing denied 462 U.S.

1

124

Biener, 52 F.Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa 1943) and United

DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964)

16

made

to the case

801(d).^^

In

De

of United States

is

which

DeSisto

is

taken as having informed Rule

a witness' prior statements made

Sisto,

first

without oath" and twice

admissible as proving the truth of what they asserted.

under oath'* were held
support that that

v.

the intention

on Rule 801(d) may be found

Further

of

in the restriction

Thus such previous statements may be

801(d)(A) to prior statements made under oath.

taken as going beyond the narrow scope of discrediting or rehabilitating a witness or
corroborating his evidence of identification, and that

the reason the rule prescribes all

is

the safeguards.

While such argument

is

plausible, there appears to be a logical risk in

picking and choosing the statements of a lying witness.

more heightened and should be
trier

of

facts.

Thus

it

is

In a criminal case the danger

sufficient to raise reasonable doubts in the

ideal that despite the notional possibility

mind of

is

the

of using Rule 801

statements as substantive evidence, they should be limited to the purpose of discrediting
or rehabilitating a witness or as corroborative evidence of identification.

Nigerian law

favors use of such evidence only for purpose of impeachment and not substantive

evidence.

^^

(C) Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted
Traditionally, the determination of whether a statement

the purpose for

35

36

which

it is

329 F.2d 929 (2d
See

offered in court.

Cir), cert, denied,

IRVING YOUNGER,

37

The statement was made

38

The statement was

also

to the Federal

made under

R

V.

Adeyemi, (1961) L.L.R. 79

hearsay has been dependent on

controlling consideration

is

whether the

377 U.S. 979 (1964)

supra note 28

trial

39

The

is

at

63

Bureau of Investigation.

oath before the grand jury and in an

initial

17

statement

is

offered to prove the truth of what

Accordingly

retain this test.

it

asserts.

The Federal Rules of Evidence

:

whenever a statement

offered for a purpose that does not depend

is

the veracity of the out-of-court declarant, because

on the

truth

of

content,

its

does not

it

its

upon

value does not turn

within the scope of the hearsay

fall

rule.^"

The

test

appears to be whether there

Sometimes

offered to prove."*'
offered.

The

it is

is

a match between the assertion and what

being

it is

easy to determine the purpose for which evidence

is

substantive law and the ingredients or elements necessary to establish a case

prescribe these.

As

a result, one can discern the purpose for which evidence

Indeed counsel

referring to these.

That way the

evidence of a statement.
easily appreciated

and

may inform

in fact

first

is

offered by

the court as to reason for adducing

element,

ie.

proponent's purpose,

may

be

be distinguished from the intrinsic assertion involved in the

statement.

The other aspect of
problematic.

The problems

the equation, the truth of the matter asserted,

are an extension, or indeed a recurrence, of the overlap

between assertions and conduct.
intention of the declarant.
In such case the analysis
as truth of
its

its

Conceptually, the dispositive consideration

declarant's assertion

simple.

intended meaning.

surface but also

intent

is

A

it

It is

hearsay

may mean

if the

proponent

points.

is to

is

it

literally says.

offering the evidence

has been rightly argued that an indirect assertion
is

offered,

is

hearsay

if the

and the task of the

figure out his intended meaning, regardless of so called "plain meaning.'"*^

RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON
EVIDENCE, 236 (3d ed, 1996)

'°

PAUL

^^

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

'^

which

Id at 823

the

Although Rule 801 seems to emphasize the

speaker meant to assert the point for which his statement
court

that

is

Yet every statement asserts not only the point plain on

some underlying

of the declarant,

more

is

LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF

supra note 33 S. 8.12 at 818
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Should the court's search be objective or subjective?

Ideally,

subjective and the enquiry will be what that particular declarant intended.

every attempt
declarant

is,

determining intent, this

at

may prove

usually, unavailable. Thus, the court

would have

the context and circumstances of a particular case,

unlikely that the court

would

factor into

its

difficult.

it

should be

But, as with

even more so since the
of

to figure out, in the light

what the declarant intended.

It is

not

consideration what a reasonable person, in

those circumstances, would intend by such statement.
but

It is

it

This

may

be subjective enquiry,

does have an objective undertone.''^

The purpose of the

assertion

-

The borderland between when a statement
just to

show

that

its

is

of the assertion

offered for

was made has sometimes produced

The usual

unsatisfactory.

offered for

it

truth

truth are

situations'*" in

where

it is

truth

results

not always easy.

and when

it

is

offered

which some may consider

which a court may deny

that a statement

is

otherwise circumstantially relevant as showing state of

on the hearer or demonstrating declarer's

mind"*' or effect

its

test is

particular knowledge.''^

This seeming problem which had earlier been identified as the tension

between the hearsay
States

words
43

V

Snow.

"Bill

^^

rule

and circumstantial evidence

The question was

is

illustrated

by the case of United

the admissibility of a piece of

Snow". The tape was affixed

name

to a case containing a gun.

It

tape with the

was a

trial

for

For a similar view see Christopher B. Mueller, Post Modern Hearsay Reform: The

Importance of Complexity, 76 Minn. L.Rev. 367, 416 (1992) (suggesting that
subjective intent should be interpreted broadly)
44

PAUL

45

United States v. Muscato, 534 F.Supp 969 (E.D.N. Y. 1982); Posner v. Dallas
County Welfare, 784 S.W. 2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Armstrong v. State, 826
P.

46

RICE, supra note 40,

2dll06(Wyo.

Bridges

v.

237

1992)

State, 19

N.W, 2d 529 (Wis

292(5thCir. 1981)
47

at

517F.2d44(9thCir. 1975)

1945); United States

v.

Parry, 649 F.2d

19

possession of unregistered firearm. The court held that the

The decision appears

instead circumstantial evidence/^

person

who

Snow.

tape

was not hearsay but

unsatisfactory.

Certainly the

affixed the tape to the case intended to say that the bag belonged to Bill

Since

it

was a case of possession,

possession of the case. Therefore the

Thus the

name

assertion

the fact to be proved

name

plate

was offered

to

was

the ownership or

prove what

asserted.

it

and the purpose of offering the statement coincided and

it

ought to

have been treated as hearsay.

The overlap between

the

two concepts

will definitely continue, but

depends on the courts which should avoid mechanical or
intent

and adopt a purposive

of their

intrinsic truth

circumstantial evidence

ii

Definition

attitude.

This

way

would be caught by
is at

the

much

legalistic interpretations

of

statements which are offered as evidence
the hearsay rule while the province of

same time not eroded.

Under Nigerian Law
Before the advent of British

rule,

and consequently the establishment of

English style court in Nigeria, adjudication of disputes was carried out

at different

forums

ranging from informal family or village councils to customary courts presided over, in

some

cases,

by

traditional

rulers.'*'^

Although these courts dispensed justice

fairly

impartially and always preferred live testimonies to secondary evidence, there

technical rule prohibiting hearsay evidence.

See also United States

v.

was no

With colonialism came the introduction of

English model courts and the extension of English

48

and

common law and

doctrines of equity

Saint Prix, 672 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. Denied,

456 U.S. 992 (1982). For a

criticism of this

and similar cases, see Feriner, supra

note 17, 16-21
49

AKINOLA AGUDA, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 3 (3rd ed, 1989); See also
T. OLA WALE ELIAS, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, (2d ed, 1963),
A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW (1963)
T.
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^°

to the country.

An

common law

English

incidence of this colonial nexus was the adoption, in Nigeria, of

By

of evidence.

that fact the hearsay rule

became applicable

in

Nigeria.

However,

in

1943 an Evidence Ordinance^'

The ordinance became operative
restyled Evidence

Act". There

is

Act"

and

an ongoing effort

preparation, by the Nigerian

in the country.

1945 and has been in force since then.

in

shall

was passed

,

It

has been

hereinafter simply be referred to as "the Evidence
at

reform of

this

Act.

Law Reform Commission,

(hereinafter referred to as the "Draft Evidence Decree").

This has resulted in the

of a Draft Evidence Decree"

The Evidence Act

since the Draft Evidence Decree has not been enacted into law. But this

reference to both instruments, the former representing the law as

it

will

make

and the

latter

work

is,

extant

is still

representing the direction of current reform efforts.

The Evidence Act was based on Stephen's Digest of
Evidence'''
5(a)

and therefore did not depart much from the

of the Act provides

that nothing in the

Act

common

the

Law

of

law. Besides, Section

shall prejudice the admissibility

of any

evidence which would, apart from the provisions of the Act, be admissible. This
50

This was done through the instrumentality of several provisions in what are called
reception statutes. Examples are Ordinance No. 3 of 1863, Interpretation Act,

High Court Law of Eastern Region, No 27 of 1955; High Court
Law of Northern Region No 8 of 1955; Law of England (application) Law of
Western Nigeria, Cap 60, Western Region High Court Law, Cap 44. See
generally A.E.W. PARK supra note 49, 5-42; T. OLA WALE ELIAS, supra note
49, 17-21; A.O. OBILADE, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM; CO.

Cap 89

section 45

OKONKWO (ed), INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN LAW
^^

"
53

Ordinance

No

27 of 1943

Cap. 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990

See Nigerian

Law Reform Commission, Workshop Papers on the Reform
Evidence Act, 324-445 (1995)

54

12th ed

of the

21

provision enables inclusive rules of common law to apply where the Act
is

is

silent."

This

because prior to the enactment of the Act, such evidence was admissible and therefore

would qualify
admissible"^^.

as "evidence
It

is

which would apart from the provisions of

noteworthy, though, that this provision

is

application of the English notion of the hearsay rule in Nigeria.
section

common law

only tolerates

rules

mandating inadmissibility. The hearsay rule

Having
Act

is

authorizing

not

this

Act be

authority for the

The reason

admissibility

is

that the

and not those

one of exclusion.

said that, three further points need be

made.

First, the

Evidence

not completely devoid of provision bordering on the hearsay rule. Secondly, the

is

courts continue to apply the

common law

hearsay rule, sometimes without reference to

the Evidence Act. Thirdly, the Draft Evidence Decree attempts an explicit and conceptual

treatment of the hearsay rule.

Section 77 of the Evidence Act provides.

Oral evidence, must in

all

cases whatever, be direct-

which could be seen,
witness who says he saw that fact;
(a) if

it

refers to a fact

(b) if

it

refers to a fact

witness
(c) if

it

who

which could be heard,

it

it

must be the evidence of a

must be the evidence of a

says he heard that fact;

refers to a fact

any other manner,

it

which could be perceived by any other sense or
must be the evidence of a witness who says he

in

perceived that fact by that sense or in that manner;

55

NWADIALO, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE, 36-93 (1981);
AGUDA, supra note 49 at 7; Yemi Osibajo, The Common Law, the
Evidence Act and Interpretation of Section 5(a), in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JUDGE ELI AS, (J. A. OMOTOLA ed) 165; Awa U. Kalu, Reform of the

See

FIDELIS

Evidence Law,

in

Workshop Papers on

Law Reform Commission ed)

the

Reform of the Evidence Act, (Nigerian

224, 228-230 (1995);

Law Okey

Azubuike,

Proposals on the Reform of the Evidence Act, in Workshop Papers on the Reform
(Nigerian Law Reform Commission ed) 279, 280-281
of the Evidence Act,
(1995)
56

See section 5(a) of the Evidence Act

22
(d) if

held,

refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is
must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those

it
it

grounds.

This

is

the nearest the Evidence Act

comes

to providing for the hearsay rule.

Section 77 appears severely limited in scope. This

A

evidence.

strict interpretation

is

of the section would

because

it

entail that

of documents

may be proved by

its

face,

deals with only oral

documentary evidence

cannot be hearsay. Section 76 seems to accentuate such conclusion.
facts except the contents

On

It

provides that "all

oral evidence".

The Evidence

Act's scheme maintains a distinction between relevancy and admissibility (means of
proof).

It is

possible to interpret the

relevant facts. But

when

document

be produced.

itself is to

two provisions

the relevant fact

is

as allowing oral evidence to prove

the content of a document, then the

Unfortunately, unlike in the United States, the courts in Nigeria have shied

away from analysing and applying
Instead they

still

apply the

the provisions of sections 76 and 77 of the Act.

common law

doctrine of hearsay.

Thus Nigerian courts make

frequent allusion to the statement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in

Subramaniam

v Public Prosecutor.^ ^

The Committee had

Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person
as a witness

may

or

may

object of the evidence

not be hearsay.
is

It is

stated:

who

is

not himself called

hearsay and inadmissible

to establish the truth

of what

when

is

when

contained

in

the
the

proposed to show by the
evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. 58
statement.

The

admissible

is

judicially accepted definition of hearsay in Nigeria

is

to a witness

" (1956)
''

not hearsay and

it

Id at

1

It is

by one who

W.L.R. 965

969

is

is

evidence of a statement

not himself called as a witness and which

is

made

offered to prove

23

the truth of the statement.''^ Similarly, notwithstanding the narrow confines of Section 77

of the Evidence Act, the courts extend hearsay

to statements

contained in documents.^"

Whilst the substance of the definition of hearsay in both jurisdictions.

United States and Nigeria, do coincide,

appears prevailing doctrine in Nigeria does not

it

attempt an exhaustive treatment of the niceties of the definition as obtainable in the

United

States.

Conceptual issues, such as the scope of the

rule,

and

its

application to

conduct, have received minimal judicial and even academic examination/'
this

against

It is

backdrop that one appreciates the attempt of the Draft Evidence Decree to elevate the

hearsay rule to a conceptual level. The decree takes the rule beyond the simplistic notion

of whether evidence of out of court statement
hearsay and enumerates situations of
the definition offered

by the decree

by confusion and resort to

is

common

its

is

offered as proof of

admissibility.

Even

if

defines

its truth. It

not entirely satisfactory,

an improvement on current regime which

is

marked

law.

Section 33 of the Draft Evidence Decree provides:

Hearsay means a statement
a) oral or written

made otherwise

(b) contained or recorded in a

which
which
in

^'

book, document or record whatever proof of

admitted under any provision of this Decree

is

not

is

tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the matter stated

it.

" Abadom

'°

than by a witness in a proceeding;

N.W.L.R. (Part 479) 1 C.A.; Nwoobosi vA.C.B. Ltd,
(1995) 6 N.W.L.R. (Part 404) 658 S.C.

v State, (1997)

1

Armel Transport Ltd v Martins, (1970)

Aguda doubts whether

AGUDA,

the rule and

supra note 49,

at

60

its
)

1

ALL N.L.R.27

exceptions are part of Nigerian law (See

while Nwadialo expresses the view that Section

77 of the Evidence Act embodies the hearsay rule and that although
deal with oral evidence,

well (See

NWADIALO,

its

its

provisions

underlying principles govern documentary evidence as

supra note 55 at 98)

24

Three points emerge from
Secondly,
Thirdly,

may

it

be

definition.

made otherwise

must be offered

it

this

in

First,

must be a statement.

the evidence

than in a proceeding or be contained in a document.

evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated in

definition accords with that contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

as to the scope of statement

may

and

also arise

is

not mitigated by Section 260( 1 ) of the

words or otherwise." This would cover conduct. Although nothing
is

is

to

A

imply intention.

representor. Therefore, if the decree

representation

involves

made

in

said about intention,

done under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the definition contained

seems

260(1)

The

The controversy

decree which defines "statement" to include any "representation of fact whether

unlike

it.

the

in Section

intention

of the

enacted into law the courts will be justified to

is

exclude, from the purview of hearsay, any conduct which the actor does not intend as a
representation of fact.

A troublesome aspect of the definition is the phrase,
by a witness

in a proceeding", contained in Section 33(a)

of one

reflection

the

problems

plague

that

understandable ambivalence in the treatment of
proceeding.'''
later

the

"made otherwise than

of the Draft Decree. This

hearsay

On

its truth.

a

an

is

testimony given in a prior judicial

Mechanical approach will regard such evidence as hearsay

proceeding for

There

doctrine.

is

if

offered in a

the otherhand, since the hearsay dangers are reduced,^"^

purposive interpretation would regard such evidence as non hearsay.

It is

arguable that

the Draft Evidence Decree prefers the purposive approach and therefore does not regard

such evidence as hearsay. Yet

62

63

IRVING YOUNGER,
See

5

of reasoning

this line

supra note 28

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

is

fraught with difficulty and

is

not

48

at

S 1370 (Chadboum rev. 1974). Presumably the

evidence has been tested by cross examination in the former proceeding. However

some

will argue that

case and that the
the

such previous cross examination will not suffice for the

trier

of facts would

demeanor of the witness

in the

still

later

be deprived of the opportunity to watch

former proceeding.

25

consistent with the general

compromise

is

to regard

exception to the

rule.

scheme of

the decree.''^

It

compHcates

such evidence as hearsay but allow

its

A

analysis.

better

admissibility as an

Indeed that appears to be the intendment of the decree. This

is

because Section 42 makes provision for the admissibility, under certain coditions, of
evidence given in a prior judicial proceeding. This creates an exception to the rule
precluding hearsay. The seeming removal of such evidence from the definition of hearsay
is

therefore not only conceptually unsound but also at variance with the general tenor of

the decree.

Another curious point

is

that contained in Section 33

recalled that the section provides that hearsay
in a

is

a

document

is

numerous exceptions, documents

admissible or not,

analysis to exclude

its

some documents from

of statement "oral or

feature significantly.

the purview of

shortcoming of Section 33 of the Draft Evidence Decree

its

maker.^''

It

The decree defines hearsay,
for situations

^^

However

it

prohibits

its

it

clogs

appears that a general

is

maintain a

admissible hearsay. The

characterization of evidence as hearsay does not conclusively render

^^

Whether

Again

is its inability to

hearsay and what

In the

the definition of hearsay

simply because they are rendered admissible by the decree.

is

provision.

document or record."

contents are assertions by

conceptual distinction between what

not admitted under any

talks

it

written" and of statement "contained or recorded in a book,
its

is

a measure of contradiction in the

Apparently the section recognises written hearsay. Thus

history of hearsay and

will be

It

means a statement "contained or recorded

book, document or record whatever proof of which

provision of this Decree..." There

(b).

it

inadmissible.

As

admission in evidence but makes exceptions

where hearsay can be admitted.

can be argued that consistent with the relevancy

where the content of a document

is itself

-

admissibility dichotomy,

the fact in issue then production of the

document is not hearsay as the fact to be proved
document and not the truth of the statement.

is

the statement contained in the

26

the decree itself recognizes, there are

many

exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay. Yet

these exceptions should not influence the determination of whether evidence

is

hearsay.

B. Prohibition against Hearsay Evidence

The tenor of both
Nigeria

is

that

the Federal Rules of Evidence and of current

law

of a general prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

in

It is

said that to every general rule there are exceptions. That statement cannot be truer with

any rule

in

law than

it is

with the hearsay

exceptions that some argue that
other words that hearsay

is

it

rule.

The

rule has

become so harmstrung with

should infact be the exception rather than the

rule.^^ In

admissible except in certain circumstances. However, current

doctrine in both jurisdictions

still

regard the general rule as that of exclusion. Rule 802 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "hearsay

these or other rules prescribed by the

is

not admissible except as provided by

Supreme Court pursuant

to statutory authority or

Act of Congress." Similarly, Section 34 of the Draft Evidence Decree provides
"Hearsay evidence

is

by

that

not admissible except as provided in this part of this Decree or by

any other enactment."

We

had

earlier alluded to the fact that the

Evidence Act does not

contain any express provision on the hearsay rule but that the rule can be implied from

Section 77 of that Act.

As subsequent

discussion will reveal, both jurisdictions reject an

absolute approach to the ban on hearsay. This attitude

is

reflected

even in the provisions

rendering hearsay inadmissible.

^^

Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 Litig. 13, 13- 17 (regarding the exclusion of
hearsay as a fiction)

CHAPTER II
RATIONALE FOR THE PROHIBITION AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
can

It

This

jurisdictions.

However

critics

untrustworthy

be

is

asserted

because

it

is

that

hearsay

viewed with suspicion

is

in

both

thought to be less reliable than live testimony.^'

canvass that the thoery that hearsay evidence

is

inherently

weak and

spurious and a legal fiction^^ and that current doctrine of exclusion

is

cannot wholly be justified on the basis of a preference for live testimony. They point to
the fact that several of the exceptions, to the rule,

Others argue that although hearsay

the declarant.^^

Yet

does not give misinformation.^"
hearsay evidence derives from

its

These are the

hearsay dangers.^'

and

do not require proof of unavailability of

all

seem

give inaccurate information

to agree that the perceived

susceptibility to

risks

may

it

weakness of

what are now known as the four

of faulty perception, faulty memory, ambiguity,

insincerity.

Like
in respect

all

humans, a declarant of hearsay might have misperceived the event

of which he spoke. Three concerns have been identified

centers

on the speaker's sensory

67

Christopher Mueller, supra note 43

68

Paul Milch, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule

capacities, another

at

on

in this regard. ^^

One

his mental capacities, ie ability to

370

And Starting

Over, 71 Or. L. Rev. 723, 745-769 (1992)
69

Id

70

Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for A Best Evidence
Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U.L. Rev. 893, 909-910 (1992)

71

Welbome

III,

supra note 12. 52-53; Milich, supra note 68

note 70 at 905;
72

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

at

726; Seigel, supra

supra note 33, S8.2, 787-790

supra note 33 S 8.2 at 788
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28

make

process and

sense of what he

and the

sees,

third

is

relevant

the

circumstances that might bear on the opportunity for him to observe the
instance if the speaker's sensory or mental capacity

is

physical

For

facts.

impaired, or otherwise not

functioning properly, he might misconstrue an event or a fact which he observed.
Similarly if there were circumstances impacting negatively on his observation,
utterance

or

narration

may

Human memory

understandable.

to assert correctly,

is

result in a distortion

The

fact.

of the

short and fallible.

faulty

memory

is

Ability to recollect, and therefore

third danger, ambiguity, is

words may convey

common

is

The speaker may say one

The hearer may misconstrue what

not capture the points of detail, qualification, or
is

with communication and the use

language with precision.

different things to different persons.

The danger of insincerity

may

fact.

thing while meaning another.

Ancillary to this

The concern with

or conflate the fact with subsequent events and again this

difficult to use a

It is

the

what may have been perceived, may be affected by several factors."

The declarant may confuse

of language.

distort

his

Besides, the language used

may

limit.''*

based on the possibility that the speaker

that the in court witness

the speaker said as

may

may

also deliberately lie

deliberately

by ascribing

lie.

to a

"declarant" what the latter never said.

A
shortcomings.
faint

remarkable point, however,

The

live witness

may have

and even the language he uses

fraudulently misrepresent.

hearsay evidence.

'^

789

human

is

prone to the above

misperceived the events, his

in

court

may be ambiguous.

memory may be
He may

also

But the difference between the two, and therefore the explanation for

Id at 788-789

Id at

that every

Therefore, in a sense, the above dangers are not peculiar to

the current stricture against hearsay,

"

is

is

two

fold. First, in the case

of hearsay evidence

29

each danger arises

at

two separate

levels.

For instance, there

is

the danger of whether the

declarant misperceived the fact and also whether the hearsay reporter misperceived what
the declarant had said.

There

is

the danger of whether the speaker

accurately and the danger of whether the in court witness accurately

The

speaker said.

trier

remembers the

fact

remembers what

the

of facts has to worry about whether the declarant interpreted the

event properly and also whether the in court witness properly interpreted the statement

made by
problem.

the declarant.

We

have already alluded

to the dual nature

Secondly, and more importantly, where direct evidence

of the insincerity
offered the

is

trial

process provides safeguards that reduce these dangers." These safeguards, or controlled
conditions,^^ help sift evidence

absence of these safeguards

is

and diminish,

if

not totally eliminate, these dangers.

The

regarded as the reason for the rule against the admissibility

of hearsay evidence. The safeguards are oath, cross examination, and demeanor.

A. Oath
In both jurisdictions, oral evidence in court

reason for the administration of oath

is

is

that

usually given

it

upon oath

is

speak the

answer

75

76

77

truth.'^

to the

It

The underlying

in the

world beyond.

would reinforce the need

therefore has a temporal as well as spiritual basis.

The argument

danger of fabrication.

Similarly,

an offense of perjury in both jurisdictions,

the fear of prosecution and consequent punishment
to

oath.^'

will induce the witness to speak the truth

because a false testimony would earn them punishment
since the giving of false testimony

upon

against hearsay

is

for a witness

Oath

is

an

that since the

Id at 791

Wellborn

III,

supra note 12

at

54

See for example section 180 of the Nigerian Evidence Act and section 202 of the
Draft Evidence Decree

78

JOHN WILLIAM STRONG
at 94;

(ed)

McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33

at

791

supra note 33
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declarant,

assuming he made an assertion

no compelling reason

in question,

was not under

oath, there

would be

to tell the truth.

However, some doubt the efficacy of oath as a stimulus

What happened comparatively

early to the oaths

to tell truth.

Morgan

notes:

of compurgators has

now

The deliberate
expression by a witness of his purpose to tell the truth by a method which
is binding upon his conscience probably still operates as some stimulus to
happened

unfortunately

tell

to

the

oaths

the truth; but fear of punishment

an oath

is

of a witness.

by supernatural forces

prosecution for perjury has

little

exclusion of hearsay evidence. They contend that

made on

then out of court statements

It is

of

effect."

Others, while not worrying about the efficacy of oath, doubt if it

others, like

for violation

generally regarded as virtually non-existent, and the threat of

Wigmore,

will

if

it is

is

a true rationale for the

a true basis for the hearsay rule

oath would be admissible but this

subsume oath

is

not

so.^°

Still

into cross examination:

thus apparent that the essence of the hearsay rule

is

a requirement that

testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross examination,

and

that the judicial expressions... coupling oath

had

in

mind

the oath as merely the ordinary

given on the stand, subject to the essential

As we
not as

many people

shall later see, not

and cross examination,

accompaniment of testimony

test

of cross examination.*'

one rationale

is

controlling.

It is

today hold oath in as high esteem as was the case in the past.

even for people without strong religious persuasion, the threat of perjury

inducement not to

lie.

It is

79

Morgan, supra note 7

80

RUPERT CROSS,

81

possible that

not

at

uncommon

Yet

is

sufficient

remind witnesses

that false

RUDD, THE NIGERIAN

LAW OF

for lawyers to

186

supra note 10

EVIDENCE,

131 (1964)

WIGMORE,

supra note 63

at

10

at

498; G.R.
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testimony exposes them to prosecution for perjury.
important consideration in the hearsay

Certainly the absence of oath

is

an

rule.

B. Cross Examination

A

jurisdictions

of the

feature

significant
is

of

litigation

the right of an opponent or adversary to cross

by the other party. In some respects
to

process

adversarial

this right

has constitutional undertones.*^ According

the

hearsay

rule

is

that

the bare untested assertion of a witness,

exposed by the

Wigmore, regarded
thought so

test

many

possible

who

as the paterfamilias of

To him

all

it

evidence scholarship,*''

as "the greatest legal engine

other safeguards are
is

shared by

subsumed

many

other

States guarantees the right to confrontation while the

WIGMORE,

supra note 63

this in the right to fair hearing.

at 3

Peter Tillers and David Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 813(1 992)
5

in

see cross examination as a "security for correctness and completeness of

Nigerian Constitution subsumes

"^

modem American

This fascination, with cross examination,

The Constitution of the United

5

underneath

be best brought to light and

highly of cross examination that he described

cross examination.
scholars

may

deficiencies,
lie

of cross examination.*^

ever invented for the discovery of truth."*'

*^

both

examine any witness called

suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness which

*'

in

Wigmore:

The theory of

*^

obtainable

WIGMORE,

supra note 63 at 3
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*^

testimony,"
evidence.

*'

and as the best

As

"all

embracing reason for the exclusion of hearsay

all

a safeguard against the four dangers, cross examination discloses:

data helpful to the

trier

witness intends to convey to the

of the witness

determining (1) what information the

in

trier

by the language he uses

of his testimony, that

in the truth

is

(2) the belief

his sincerity (3) the

remember

extent to

which what the witness purports

memory

or of some other mental process such as reconstruction or the

mistaken adoption as his
extent to

own of

which what the witness

what was then and there open

to

is

the product of

the experience of another

testifies that

and

(4) the

he perceived corresponds to

of being

to his observation or capable

perceived."*^

When

evidence

is

put through the crucible of cross examination, the

be able to properly evaluate
if the

it

and

witness misperceived the

the fact

is

language

to ascribe the appropriate

fact, cross

examination will reveal

defective this will also be apparent
is

ambiguous,

in cross

weight to

trier

it.

this.

of facts would

The idea

If his

is

that

memory of

upon proper cross examination. And

if his

examination he might clarify the meaning which he

intends by his evidence.

The
answer

controversial

to fabrication.

surrounding

A

issue

is

whether cross examination

circumstances

and with prior statements.

JOHN WILLIAM STRONG
at

87

an adequate

lying witness has a tendency not to be consistent both with

Therefore,

examination well conducted will reveal inconsistencies and enable the

86

is

(ed),

ideally,

trier

McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

cross

of facts to

supra note 33

95

at 498; MICHAEL M. MARTIN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, 299, (6th ed, 1988); Moorehead, supra note 4 at

Rupert Cross, supra note 10

218
88

EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION,
supra note 4

at

21

142-143 (1956); See also Moorehead,
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evaluate the evidence.

Yet

has been asserted that "cross examination

it

useful in exposing fabrication than in exposing defects in

well schooled perjurer

may

examination.

a case are resolved on matters

is

no reason

After

in

all,

many

jurisdictions, the cross

to

coming out during cross

In majority of the cases, an effective cross examination will give

insincere witness.

The

perception."**^

be able to withstand cross examination but this

Many

deprecate the mechanism.

memory and

probably less

is

away an

examiner has very wide

For instance under the Nigerian Evidence Act he can ask the witness any

latitude.

question:

(a) to test his accuracy, veracity, or credibility; or

(b) to discover
(c) to

There

is

notes,

it

no doubt

is."

^'

he

credit,

is

and what

is

his position in life; or

by injuring his character.

that cross

examination

does not ensure that evidence

unreliability

it

shake his

who

is

^°

is reliable,

but "merely exposes the sources of

and provides a basis for evaluating testimony and determining

There appears a consensus that the absence of this important device

concern which informs the rule prohibiting hearsay. But
exhaustive.

As we have

it is

how

reliable

a principal

is

not the sole basis nor

is it

seen, hearsay in the nature of evidence in prior proceedings

generally prohibited although there are exceptions to the

absence of cross examination

is

is

arguable that

if the

the only basis for excluding hearsay, statements

made

where an adversary had had the opportunity
89

As Mary Morton

an important safeguard.

to

rule.''^

cross

It is

examine

will

ordinarily

Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach To Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich.

be

L. Rev. 51,

96(1987)
90

Section 200 Evidence Act; See also Mueller, supra note 4 at 291

91

Mary Morton,

92

JOHN WILLIAM STRONG
94-95

supra note 2 at 307; See also Mueller, supra note 4 at 291
(ed),

McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

supra note 33
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A

admissible.

counter argument would be that such prior opportunity

examination would not suffice
different. Nonetheless,

in a later case

where the

parties

C.

complemented by

is

cross

and issues may be

farfetched to contend that the absence of cross examination

it is

the exclusive rationale for the exclusion of hearsay evidence.

reason, but

for

It

is

is

indeed a principal

others.

Demeanor
By demeanor

evidence.

The argument

is

meant the comportment of the witness while giving

is

that the solemnity

of the court scenario and the possibility of

disgrace, coupled with the presence of the adversary, will deter falsehood and intimidate

witness to

of facts

the truth.

tell

^^

In another context, the

to evaluate his evidence

As Mueller and

and importantly,

demeanor of the witness helps the
to decide

whether he

many mannerisms and human

Kirkpatrick note,

is

assess credibility and meaning. ^"^

composed or

What

fidgeting.

carry himself? All these and
truth.

They

is

of

more

'^

How

trier

of

into the
facts to

whether the witness

facts will consider

his facial expression?

does

is

this witness generally

have a bearing on whether the witness

a relationship between

oath and cross examination.
truth

trier

come

is

telling the

also help the trier offsets to evaluate the evidence.

There

tell

is

The

truthful or not.

qualities

comportment of the witness and an assessment of these points enable the

trier

may

demeanor and the other

The solemnity of

essentially derive

the court

trial

safeguards of

room which induces witness

from the oath taken, and demeanor

is

to

best evaluated

under cross examination.

"

Milich, supra note 65, 741-743

'^

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

'^

For more considerations see
8.3 at

792

supra note 33 S 8.3

at

792

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

supra note 33 S
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Where
facts is deprived

a witness narrates what an out of court declarant said, the trier of

of the opportunity

to

observe the out of court declarant,

who

really the

is

witness, the other merely being his conduit for transmitting the testimony.

deprivation impacts on the evaluation of the evidence.

have
is

all

him

the factors necessary for

The

of facts will thereby not

and ascribe weight

to assess the evidence

yet another important concern of both jurisdictions

trier

This

which leads them

to

to, as

it.

This
were,

it

view hearsay with suspicion.

The above

three reasons are traditional bases usually asserted for the

However, these are not exhaustive and

exclusion of hearsay.

to

them may be added a

myriad of other reasons some of which are examined here.

D. Mistrust of Jury

A

remarkable feature of the Anglo American

trial

process

is

jury in the determination of facts. The essential characteristic of this practice

laymen

disinterested

company with

its

in the resolution

Americn counterpart

short while in Nigeria,

it

evidence. "^^

lawlessness
but which

is

from basing an

this rationale

that hearsay evidence is

essential

finding

upon

There are two aspects to the argument.
^*

is

or simply misconduct.
prejudiced,

may

A jury

would not apply

the
is

Hart and

98

Park, supra note 89 63-64; Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule
to

"prevent

of hearsay

to

of a case
anchor

in the

and the

Law.

Stability

,

its

132

Mc Naughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 56 (LERNER (ed) 1958)
A Response

reed

peg on which

97

Verdicts:

parts

what may be termed jury

RUDD,

at

in order to

slender

96

supra note 77

Law

in Nigeria.''^

that appreciates the unreliability

find in hearsay evidence a

the use of

system was practiced for a

excluded

One

is

Here Nigerian

facts.

for although the jury

no longer obtains and

The perception
errant juries

of disputes on

the use of a

in

of

Professor Nesson, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1986)
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decision and

camouflage

its

prejudice.

misperceive the hearsay and give

it

The second aspect

is that

the jury

undue weight.^^

While these concerns are genuine, they are not peculiar
not supported by the history and evolution of jury
gather their
until

own

may simply

trials.

and are

to a jury

In the past, juries

were

information and to use such information in their decisions.

It

free to

was not

about the middle of the eighteenth century that restrictions were placed upon the

sources of information usable by a jury. Morgan, after surveying the evolution of these
restrictions, points out that

by

this time:

The jury had been transformed from a body chosen by the court to
determine what the facts were from their own knowledge and from such
sources as they deemed reliable without any control from the parties to a
body which must depend solely on materials presented in court - most if
not all of them by the parties. In other words, the sources of usable
information were transferred from the control of the jury to the control of
the parties.

Not supported by
fire

'°"

the antecedents of the jury system, this rationale has also

from commentators who argue

evidence, like

DNA,

and

that after

evaluate hearsay evidence.""

that jurors evaluate

Besides,

some consider

jurors perceive and treat hearsay evidence.

100

Moorehead, supra note

4,

complex and sometimes technical

competent closing arguments, jurors should be able

jury's function as the ultimate fact finders."^'

99

come under

Two

this rationale inconsistent

with the

There have been some studies on

such studies revealed that jurors do not

EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF, supra note 88 at
at

741

101

Milich, supra note 68, 724, 725 and 771

102

Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 43, 66

(1994)

how

212-214

See also Milich, supra note 68

to

109;

over value

'°^

hearsay and are rather skeptical

'"''

of hearsay. Although the researches are

not conclusive and in fact suggest further studies on the matter, their outcome
interesting for

may

it

hearsay evidence.

the rule will,

it

do disregard

if jurors

serves no useful purpose admitting such evidence. Opponents of

on the other hand, argue

that

no prejudice or

admission of hearsay evidence since jurors do not over value
suggests that jurors should be provided with

conundrum

indeed

support both the abolition and the retention of the rule against

Proponents of the rule will readily argue that

hearsay evidence then

is

all

injustice

it.

is

occasioned by

Indeed one of the studies

evidence including hearsay.

"^^

The

continues.

The problem

is

the seeming focus

on jury competence, and even mistrust,

as if jurors are peculiarly disabled from evaluating hearsay.

Mueller, that no matter what

is

said about jury sophistication

While one agrees with

and universal education, the

claim that jurors can perform well without the benefit of demeanor evidence and cross

examination

is suspect,'^''

imbued with the capacity
that the rule applies

even

the point

103

is

no human, juror or non juror,

to

bench
is

trials."'^

The underlying

the difficulty of evaluation.

This
issue,

is

perhaps the reason

which dove

Viewed

tails into

in that context, the

unanswerable.

of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992)

Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park, and Steven C. Penrod, Jurors Perception
'

of Eyewitness and hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.
105

is

See Peter Miene, Roger C. Park and Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and
the Evaluation

104

that

to assess such evidence accurately.

the four traditional dangers,

concern with the jury

must be made

L. Rev.

703 (1992)

Id

106

Mueller, supra note 43 at 383

107

Moore

v.

United States, 429 U.S. 20 1976. See Callen, supra note 99
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E. Unfair Surprise
Litigation

is

a gamble.

unpredictability associated with

prepare cases.

A

party

it.

The

of rules

role

is to

reduce the uncertainty and

If hearsay is freely admissible

it

becomes

would not know what evidence the other

has.

difficult to

is

It

possible,

through discovery and deposition, to have notice of the evidence an opponent plans to
use.

But where hearsay may be admissible the uncertainty remains and a party may

The hearsay

thereby spring surprise on the other.
surpnse.

F.

rule operates to avoid such unfair

108

Unbridled Judicial Discretion
Similar to the rationale based on need to avoid surprise

that the hearsay rule avoids uncontrolled judicial discretion.

human

judges cannot be trusted but that being

"*''

they

may

judge's personal predilection

is

An

objective

way

the argument

The argument

not that

is

be influenced by extraneous

considerations in the admission or rejection of hearsay and this

consequences on the outcome of cases.

is

may have

serious

of a

to curtail the influence

the introduction of objective constraints such as are

erected by the hearsay rule.

However,

as a discussion of the exceptions to the rule will reveal, the

hearsay rule merely reduces the judge's discretion.

of the exceptions,
for

exceptions, a judge

considers that
'"^

its

may

discretion.

still

'

'"

in

reject hearsay

probative value

is

Nigeria, where there are no

it.

Some

its

prejudicial effect. "°

call

residual

which comes under an exception

outweighed by

if

Mueller, supra note 43 and 397

See Section 6 Evidence Act

he

The concern

Park, supra note 89 at 62; Park, supra note 98 at 1060; Mueller, supra note 43 at

396
'°^

Even

does not totally eliminate

under the Federal Rules of Evidence,

like the residual exceptions

exercise of judicial

It

39

here

is

not dissimilar to that

shown about

An

the jury.

can admit or reject hearsay as a cloak to cover his
mistaken. Again this concern
in

both jurisdictions

judges.

Thus

is

is

human

not peculiar to the field of hearsay.

and criminal processes,

He may

also be

litigation

system

prejudice.

The

unbounded

yet to repose total confidence in the

in both civil

and the judge's role

is

errant judge, like an errant jury,

rules, regulating

discretion of

procedures, abound

simply to administer these with minimal discretion.

G. Constitutional Rationale
In the province of criminal cases hearsay evidence

The Sixth Amendment

constitutional barrier.

In

all

to the

comes

against a

United States Constitution provides:

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy

and public
crime

trial,

shall

by an impartial jury of the
been

have

committed,

state

which

and

district

wherein the

shall

district

have

been

previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation: to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have

compulsory process

for obtaining witnesses in his favor,

and

to

have the

assistance of counsel for his defense.'"

This provision

is

"Witnesses"

said to be prone to several interpretations.

everyone whose statement

is

used against the accused.

witnesses that the prosecution choose to produce.

Secondly,

Thirdly,

it

it

may mean

may mean

may mean

all

the

available

witnesses."^
Strictly

interpreted, the confrontation clause

would forbid

all

hearsay

thereby not only rendering the rule against hearsay redundant in a criminal case but also
stultifying prosecutions in

many

instances.

However, a conspectus of the judicial

reveals that the courts, notably the United States

'"

"^

Compare with

Supreme Court, evince an

section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution

Park, supra note 89, 88-89

terrain

attitude

40

The

favoring the relevance of the rule and deferring to the exceptions.

concern

is

constitutional

with the need for a defendant to confront his accusers. The Court has held that

prior cross examination "^ and the opportunity for subsequent cross examination,"'' of a

hearsay declarant, would satisfy the constitutional requirement. The stance
the atypical setting of a criminal case

where the prosecution often desires

is

apposite in

to use

evidence

given in a grand jury hearing.

For the general situations of use of an out of court statement, the court has
laid

down

a two pronged approach to determination whether or not such evidence will

implicate the confrontation clause. This
is

that the prosecution

make good

efforts

have been made

the test

is

is

to

faith efforts to

is

presumed

Two

Ohio

Roberts. "^

v.

114

v.

California

that

the

produce him.

reliable if

it

is

declarant
It

is

unavailable,

the

appears whether good faith

reliability

of the hearsay.

comes under a firmly rooted exception.

inferences arise from the second prong of the

test.

First,

it

it

means

that

does not come

This would appear to be so even where the statement

Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Ohio

v.

prong

produced the accused would have the

must make a showing of the

under a firmly rooted exception.

Pointer

first

that the declarant

the prosecution has a burden of showing reliability of the statement if

113

The

be decided on the facts of each case. "^ The other prong of

that the prosecution

Here a statement

is

To show

of confronting him.

prosecution must

in

must produce the hearsay declarant or show

Certainly where the declarant

unavailable.

opportunity

was done

v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); United States

v.

Owens, 484 U.S. 554

(1988)
115

448 U.S. 56(1980)

116

Barber

was

in

Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (failure of prosecution to bring witness who
prison in a neighboring state was not excused); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
V.

56 (1980) (good

faith effort

her parental home)

found where prosecution

tried to serve declarant at

41

The problem

comes under an exception.
exceptions"

pronged

test

may

Secondly,

be wide."'

may

be admissible even

While there seems not

to

if

it is

is

that

the

of "firmly rooted

category

arguable that a statement satisfying the two

does not come under a recognized exception.

it

have been a judicial endorsement of the point, the view appears

a regrettable implication of the

tests.

Unfair as

it

may seem,

the consequence

logical if considered along with the Court's position that the accused

hearsay evidence which exculpates him.
clear that

is

It

due process caution against
fair hearing.

"^

and an

free use

freely

be

adduce

"^

restrictive

The confrontation

constitutional undertones.

of

the

may

may

shown

attitude

to

hearsay does have

clause, in criminal cases,

and the right

to

of hearsay. In Nigeria, both come within the rubric

In both civil and criminal proceedings parties are entitled to fair hearing

essential content of this right

evidence negates the right

is

is

That hearsay

the right to confront adversaries.

one of the reasons

it is

generally inadmissible.

H. Other Rationales

The category of

rationales

is

not closed.

Numerous

other reasons are

proffered as justification for the maintenance of the rule against the admissibility of

117

The following have been said to be firmly rooted exceptions: former testimony
{Ohio V. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Coconspirator exception {United States v.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); business records, dying declarations

records (Ohio
118

Chambers

v.

(1979); see

v.

and public

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

Mississippi,

Edward

J.

410 U.S. 284 (1973); Green

v.

Georgia, 442 U.S. 95

Imwinkelried, the Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The

Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments Permit or Require

the

Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 553 (1992)

(suggesting that the prosecution cannot surmount

common law and

hearsay rules, whereas the accused can use hearsay which
119

is

statutory

material)

See section 33 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and

Ahinkumi

v.

Kasimu,{\962) N.N.L.R. 26 (use,

in later proceeding,

of evidence

given in prior proceedings was held to violate the right of fair hearing)

42

hearsay evidence.

It is,

for instance, said that the rule protects the
'"'

process and prevents abuse of governmental power.
'^"

burden of tracking witnesses to the prosecution.
rationalizes the rule

witnesses.

once

''^

learnt.

on the need

underdog

Besides,

it

is

'""

in the trial

said to shift the

Professor Charles Nesson even

of verdicts and avoiding recanting by

for stability

Others suggest that the niceties of the rule are hard to learn and cherished
Therefore lawyers,

nuances of the

who have

rule, resist attempts to

advantage in the

trial

As

process.

much time and

spent

do away with

it

,

resources learning the

so as to retain their competitive

'^^

a result of the presence of the four infirmities, hearsay evidence

just like any other evidence.

'^^

It

is

presents an intractable complexity and subtlety,

requiring an unusual appraoch.

The hearsay

performs the function of screening

this extraordinary evidence.

answer the several concerns discussed above.

rule,

No

even

if

not
'^^

seen as a rule of thumb,
In doing so,

particular rationale

can be merged into the need to ensure that unreliable evidence

is

is

it

attempts to

controlling but

all

not received by the

court.
120

Park, supra note 89 at 65, quoting R.

LEMPERT AND

MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE,

SALTZBURG, A

521-522 (2nd ed, 1982)

121

Park, supra note 89 at 68; Mueller, supra note 43 at 393

122

Park, supra note 89 at 103

123

S.

Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event:

On Judicial Proof and the

Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985) For a critique of the view
see
124

Roger Park, supra note 98

Milich, supra note 68 at 764; Park, supra note 89 at 68; Park, supra note 98 at

1059-1060; Professor Ronald Allen regards

Ronald Allen, The Evolution of Hearsay
797,801 (1992)
125

reason as scandalous. See

a Rule ofAdmission, 76 Minn. L. Rev.

Mortimer R. Kadish and Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8
PHIL. 332, 349(1989)

126

to

this

Tillers

and Schum, supra note 84

at

858

Law

CHAPTER III
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
In maintaining a balance between the need for evidence, on the one hand,

and the equally important objective of preventing the use of unreliable evidence, the law
recognizes

many

exceptions to the hearsay rule.

This

is

true for both jurisdictions

although the structure of the exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence

is

more

expansive and detailed than what obtains under Nigerian law.

The exceptions
necessity.

'"^

statement

may

thereby

make

statement

In other

are usually rationalized

words the circumstances attending a

And,

if

particular kind of out of court

be such as to significantly reduce the impact of the hearsay dangers and
it

safe to dispense with

may be made

in

all,

circumstances where

and under circumstances,

a document,

it

may

document would speak

it

is

fabricate.

that the statement

As

a result, in

that dispensing with the trial safeguards

Similarly, even though hearsay dangers

acute that a choice has to be

thought that the declarant would not

may

It

may

safely be

be assumed that the danger of ambiguity

for itself.

some of these

also be

made

in

presumed accurate.
is

minimized as the

cases, the

law considers

would not occasion miscarriage of

may

The

or some, of the in court safeguards.

have the opportunity or desire to misrepresent or
situations,

on the bases of trustworthiness and

may

be so

at all.

Here

be present, the need for evidence

made between hearsay evidence and no evidence

justice.

again the law opts to err on the side of admitting the hearsay evidence and then hope that
the trier of facts

would properly evaluate

it.

Sometimes, too, one hearsay danger

may

be

heightened while the others are minimized.

'^^

Milich, supra note 68 at 726; Moorehead, supra note 4 at 246; Laurence Tribe,

Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 961-69; Park, supra note 89, 69-73
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Necessity and trustworthiness surely underlie the exceptions but some

argue that they do not explain
admission.'^*

They suggest

that

all

it is

binding

is

to

Although admission need not be against the party's

Besides, the reason the adversarial process treats admission as

usually so.

the likelihood that

it

would be

Others argue that there

trustworthiness.

Such commentators point

admission receives non hearsay treatment simply on the

basis of the adversarial process.
interest,

the exceptions.

So, to that extent,

true.

may

it

is

founded on

not be any intrinsic reliability in the

exceptions and that they are simply treated as exceptions because of the social consensus
that these types

of evidence are reliable and can be evaluated by jurors.

to vary the underlying

'^^

It is

possible

themes of the exceptions and to focus on the several integral

aspects of those themes, but if a broad statement of the justification, for the various

exceptions, can be made,
their

seeming

it

is

that the exceptions are maintained

because of necessity and

reliability.

The Federal Rules of Evidence contain twenty nine exceptions

to the

hearsay rule. Five of these exceptions require a demonstration of the unavailability of the
declarant while the others do not.

The remaining

part of this chapter

is

devoted to a

consideration of a select few of the exceptions that do not require proof of unavailability

of the declarant.

It

also considers the Nigerian equivalents of those exceptions.

The

exceptions requiring proof of unavailability of a declarant will be treated in Chapter IV,

128

Mueller, supra note 43

at

385-386. Professor Ronald Allen rejects the rationale of

necessity and trustworthiness. See Allen, supra note 124 at 801 (asserting that

"no one argues any more that the exceptions can be understood as driven by a
coherent mix of necessity and reliability ...")
129

Morton, supra note 2

at

1309

45

EXCEPTIONS

NOT REQUIRING PROOF OF UNAVAILABILITY OF

DECLARANT
A. Exceptions Based on the concept of Res Gestae
Defining the concept of res gestae

is

perhaps one of the most difficult

tasks in evidence scholarship. Like the organism amoeba,
is

to

which has so many shapes and

therefore considered to be shapeless, res gestae covers so

An

be incapable of legal definition.

wide a variety of evidence

English judge once saw

it

as

as providing "a

respectable legal cloak for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision can be
applied."
to

'^"

It is

used to describe statements, and

in

some cases

acts,

"so spontaneous as

be considered part of a transaction rather than merely a witness's account of it."
Admissibility of res gestae evidence

is

'^'

based on the theory that the

proximity, in terms of time, of the statement to the transaction and the fact that the
declarant

may have

acted under the stress produced by the event respectively enhances

accuracy and forecloses, or

at least

notwithstanding, res gestae

is vilified

nature.

'^^

Wigmore expressed

This phrase

is

and regarded with disdain because of

inexact and indefinite in

its

scope, and ambiguous in

to

vague

which

its

The phrase res gestae has long been not only

extremely useless but even positively harmful.

of evidence

its

This

the distaste thus:

reasons for the doctrine...

rule

'^'

diminishes, the possibility of fabrication.

it

It is

useless because every

has ever been applied can be explained in the

terms other than that principle.

It is

harmful because

its

ambiguity invites

the confusion of one rule with another and this creates uncertainty as to the

130

131

Homes

v.

Newman

(1931) 2 Ch. 112

at

120

William Gorman Passannante, Res Gestae, the Present Sense Impression
Exception and Extrinsic Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)

and its
132

133

State counterparts, 17

Moorehead, supra note 4

at

Fordham Urb.

204

Passannante, supra note 131 at 89

L.J. 89,

96 (1988/1989)

its

46
limitations of botli.

element

in

It

ougiit therefore to be

wholly repudiated as a vicious

our legal phraseology. There are words enough to describe the

Even

rules of Evidence.

if there

any name would be preferable

were no accepted name for the doctrine
to

an empty phrase so encouraging to

looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision.

Despite these criticisms, res gestae has remained fairly

'^"*

All that has been done

resilient.

'^^

the removal of the term from the Rules of Evidence while retaining the substance.

is

In a sense, however, the concern of scholars, like

Wigmore, has been met. The Federal

Rules of Evidence does not use the term and the four specific exceptions that incorporate
the substance of the concept appear to have clearly distinct and fairly demarcated spheres.

Overlapping

may

exist but

is

minimal.

These exceptions are present sense impression,

excited utterance, then existing mental, emotional or physical condition or state of mind.

i.

Present Sense Impression
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides

The following
declarant

is

are not excluded

by the hearsay

rule,

even though the

available as a witness (1) Present sense

statement describing or explaining an event or condition
declarant

134

was perceiving

impression.

made while

the

the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1767 AT 180, 182-183 (3rd ed
CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND KIONKA, supra note 24
6

A

J

1940) See also

and Moorehead,

supra note 4 (arguing that res gestae exceptions should be abolished because they
are based

on a

fallacy that the mental effect of excitement

is

an immediate

heightening of perception and accurate recall and an abatement of the propensity
to fabricate or misperceive)
135

GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
803.18

at

S

391 (1987) (the author includes statements for purposes of medical

diagnosis or treatment but

requirement that

is

it is

doubtful if this would meet the contemporaneity

the hallmark oires gestae); Moorehead, supra note 4 at

204
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For hearsay statement to be admissible under
requirements must be satisfied. '^^
condition.

It

tliis

must have perceived an event or

First, the declarant

seems "event" or "condition" covers any relevant

which

fact

by the statement. The declarant must have personally perceived the
this

requirement excludes the use of multiple hearsay. Suppose

A

B

(the declarant)

who immediately echoes

be admissible under Rule 803(1) ?

It

seems

that

it.

Would

provided the

is

to

fact. It is

be proved
doubtful

if

perceives an event and,

contemporaneous with the event, makes a statement describing
heard by

foundational

rule, three

it,

which statement

the statement,
initial

made by

is

B,

statement, by A, can

be admitted as present sense impression, or indeed under any other exception, B"s
statement will be admissible as double hearsay under Rule 805.

Secondly, the statement must describe or explain the event or condition.
is

usually simple to determine whether a statement describes an event or condition.

mere narration of the event or condition
wider and

is

said to cover situations

However

where the statement

condition.'^^ In this respect that term

the exception for

will suffice.

It

A

the term "explain" appears

interprets or assesses

an event or

expands the scope of the exception and inches near

excited utterance which requires a statement merely to "relate" to a

startling event or condition.

The

third

and most significant requirement for admissibility of a statement

as a present sense impression

event or condition. While
event or condition, which

an event
"'

may

be so

it

it

138

is

that the statement

must be contemporaneous'^* with the

made

ideal that the statement be

describes or explains, account

fast that a description

is

supra note 33,

s

taken of the possibility that

8.34 at 915;

supra note 135 S. 803(3)(4) and

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

concurrently with the

and an explanation may simply not keep pace

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
WEISSENBERGER,

'"

is

(5),

370-372

supra note 33, S 8.34 at 916

United States v Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th

Cir.

1979)

48

with

In that situation, the requirement

it.

the event or

by case

condition.

basis,

what

exclude statements

is

It is

is

made immediately

that the statement be

a matter of judicial construction, and application,

"immediately thereafter". But courts should be

when

strict

after

on a case

and always

they cannot reasonably be said to describe or explain a presently

may prove an

perceived impression. Otherwise Rule 801(3)

indirect

way of

admitting

statements of recent perception, a proposed exception which was rejected by the United

Congress

States

trustworthiness"

as

and

"unwarranted

bearing

not

courts require corroboration for a statement of recent perception to
is

that such statement is admissible

corroboration, although the absence of corroboration

However

of

^^

be admissible'''" but a better analysis

it.

guarantees

'

Some

to

sufficient

in

most

may

situations the in court witness

affect the

even without

weight to be ascribed

would be someone who was with

the declarant and also observed the event and condition.

He would always

provide

corroboration for the statement.'"" The underlying philosophy for the exception for
present sense impression

dangers.

Its

is

that

answers to the concerns of

it

at least

two of

the hearsay

contemporaneity with the event or condition eliminates the danger of faulty

memory and

time for reflection thereby precluding possibility of fabrication.'''^

"' See H.R.

REP. NO. 650, 93d Cong.,

1st sess.

The Recent Perception Exception

6 (1973); See also Kenneth E. Kraus,

to the

Hearsay Rule

:

A

Justifiable Track

Record, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1525 (1985)
"° See

Jones v

State, 65

Md App.

121, 123-25,

499 A. 2d 511, 512-13 (1985), revM, 311

Md. 23,A.2dl69(1987)
'"

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

"' Id at 914;

WEISSENBERGER,

supra note 33 S 8.34 at 915

supra note 135 S 803.2

at

370; Passannanta, supra

note 128, 99-100. But see Quick, Hearsay, Excitement

and the Uniform Rules

Reappraisal of Rule 63 (4). 6 Wayne L. Rev. 204 210 (1960), for a suggestion
that the spontaneity requirement does not necessarily guarantee trust worthines.
:

A

ii.

Excited Utterance
This exception

Evidence which

is

contained in Rule 803 (2) of the Federal Rules of

states:

The following
declarant

is

are not excluded

by the hearsay

For admissibility under

would be an

there
is to

is

this heading, there

is startling

statement

the declarant

was

must be a

depends on each case, the

startling event or condition.'"'

test

being subjective.'"" Usually

external event but the preponderance of judicial and academic opinion

the effect that the event

may

be proved by the statement, the admissibility of which

in issue. '"^ Secondly, the event or condition

declarant.'"''

made while

A

of excitement caused by the event or condition.

stress

Whether an event

even though the

available as a witness: (2) Excited utterance.

relating to a startling event or condition

under the

rule,

Here again the

test is subjective.

must produce a

The court

is

stressful effect

on the

not to consider whether the

event or condition would have a stressful effect on a reasonable person but whether

have such effect on the particular declarant. The third foundational requirement
declarant must have

'"'

made

that the

a statement relating to the startling event or condition.'"^

Passannanta, supra note 131 at 108;

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

S8.35at917;WEISSENBERGER,
Morgan

is

did

it

It is

supra note 33

supra note 135 S. 803.8 375-376; See also

v Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that in determining

spontaneity court should consider the age, physical and mental state of the
declarant, the

amount of time, the subject matter and

144

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

'"'

United States v Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570-571 (7th

supra note 33 S 8.35 at 91

Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 91, 100 (1937);

supra note 33
'"'

Id

8.35 at 917;

Edmund Morgan, Res
MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
Cir. 1986);

8.35 at 923

Passannanta, supra note 131 at 108;
S.

147

S.

characteristics of the event)

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note

WEISSENBERGER,

supra note 135 S.

803.8, 375-376

33

50

this

statement

requirement

more

is

proponent

the

that

liberal

usually

offers

This

evidence.

in

foundational

than that applicable to present sense impression in the sense

that the phrase, "relating to", has a

wider connotation than

Rule 803(1) counterpart,

its

"describing or explaining".

Although, theoretically, the three foundational requirements are

The statement may

practice they tend to merge.
startling event, or condition,

frame for the

stipulate a time

made under

and of the

stress

statement.''*^

at the

same time be evidence of

the facts of each case.
stress as a result

It

stress

the

of excitement. The rule does not expressly

However, the requirement

the stress of excitement operates to exclude statements

of sufficient time for the

distinct, in

of excitement to cease. This

made

after the lapse

a question to be decided on

is

has been suggested that a statement

of a reminder of the event or condition

that the statement be

made

may

after a recurrence

of

be admitted although the

court has to pay close attention to the conditions.'"''

The reason an excited

utterance

momentarily numbs the declarant's

memory would

still

Neumer

admissible

is

that the stress

ability to fabricate.'^'' Besides,

it

is

of excitement

thought that his

be fresh while he makes the statement.'^' Therefore the hearsay

dangers of insincerity and faulty

'^^

is

memory

are eliminated. If the elements of spontaneity

v Clinkenbeard, 466 F.Supp. 54 (W.D. Okla. 1978)

(

statement,

made seven

minutes after the event, was admitted); Guthrie v United States, 207 F.2d (19 D.C.
Cir. 1953) (statement, made eleven hours after the event, was admitted)
"'

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33

"°

WEISSENBERGER,

supra note 135

KIRKPATRICK,supra

S. 803.7 at

S. 8.35 at

375;

921

MUELLER AND

note 33 S. 8.35 at 916; Aviva Orenstein,

"My God!" A
:

Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85

Rev. 159, 173 (1997); JACK B WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE S803(2) (01)
Calif. L.

151

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
WEISSENBERGER,

supra note 33

S. 8.35,

916-917;

supra note 135 S.803.7 374-375
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and excitement, inherent in an excited utterance, are the raison d' etre for the exception,

same time

they at the

attract the strongest criticisms against the exception. It

has been

consequence of

argued that the assumption that descriptive accuracy

is

immediate observation, and

by contemporaneous statement

that this accuracy is preserved

under spontaneous exclamation,

is

a

inherently flawed.'" Instead

exaggerates and distorts.'" Moreover, people view observation
reservation.

and

'^''

Secondly,

that courts

it

is

argued that spontaneity

sometimes allow much time

Professor Stanley

Goldman concludes

trustworthiness.'^^

He

earlier

is

that

lapse.

is

'^^

natural

it

is

noted that excitement

made under emotion with

not easily measured after the fact

On

the basis of these criticisms.

spontaneous exclamation

fails

the test of

echoes the sentiment which Professors Hutchins and Slesinger

expressed that "on psychological grounds, the rule might very well read: Hearsay

inadmissible, especially (not except) if

it

be a spontaneous exclamation"'". Professor

Orenstein elucidates the objection to the claim of sincerity. She asserts that "if twentiethcentury intellectual thought has taught us anything,

awareness

are,

and yet

how

generally

it

is

oblivious

how
we

intricate

human thought and

are

their

to

processes"'^^

Furthermore, she contends that the assumption, that an excited speaker would not
fabricate, ignores the vast cognitive process that

go on as part of an utterance. '^"^ In

'" Stanley A.

Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a "Firmly
Rooted" Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 453, 459 (1990)

'"Id

at

461

"' Id at

462

"' Id at

460

"' Id at

463

'" Hutchins

and Slesinger, Some Observations on the

Rev. 432,439(1928)
'^*

Orenstein, supra note 150 at 179

''Mdatl78

Law of Evidence,

28 Colum. L.
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addition, the excited utterance exception

is

criticised as ignoring the

experiences of

and other allegedly dominated persons who deviate from the exception's

women

paradigm of quick

where studies have shown

that the survivors are

spontaneous statements and
It is

Orestein alludes to cases of rape and other sexual assaults

report.'^"

prone to be withrawn instead of making

reports."''

not possible to have an exception that

is

completely foolproof. Despite

the criticisms levelled againt the excited utterance doctrine,

reduction of the insincerity problem. While excitement

its

may

significant merit

is

lead to exaggeration,

hardly conduces to outright fabrication. Guarding against a particular hearsay danger

involve a

fair

compromise of another. The dilema of law has always been

The danger of misperception, which may

respective concerns.

nature of excited utterance,

is

the

arise

to

it

may

weigh the

from the emotional

considered minimal. The peculiar attitude of survivors of

rape or other sexual assaults can

still

be accommodated under the current doctrine of

excited utterance. This can be done by an elastic interpretation of the stress requirement,
since such victims tend to experience the trauma for a long time.
to

iii.

be a cut off point

Then

if the

exception

is

However

there

still

to retain credibility.

Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (3) enacts:

The following
declarant

is

are not excluded

by the hearsay

available as a witness: (3)

physical condition.

A

Then

rule,

even though the

existing mental, emotional, or

statement of the declarant's then existing state of

mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as

intent,

plan,

motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a
statement of
unless

it

memory

declarant's will.

''Mdatl61
'"Id 199-210

or belief to prove the fact

remembered or believed

relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or

terms of

has
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This exception

expansive in the sense that

is

mentioned are merely

illustrative,

it

covers several states of mind. The ones

not exhaustive, of the states of

mind

that

can come

under the exception. However, to be admissible, the statement must be made while the
particular state of

mind

subsists.'"

The exception does not accommmodate statements

relating to past condition unless they relate to the declarant's will.

A

controversial aspect of the exception

and plan. Prior

intent or future conduct

was

principle
intent to

the Hillmon doctrine

to the

from Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon^ ^^

The

insurers resisted the claim

still

alive.

The

plaintiff

on the theory

had alleged

that

shots from his companion, John Brown.

had been

tolerance of statement of

that a statement indicating the speaker's

show

to

its

enactment of the exception, the controlling

which held

do something could be admitted

is

which involved a

,

Hillmon, whose

that

Hillmon had died as a

The

The doctrine arose

that he did the thing.

life

life

result

insurance claim.

was

insured,

was

of accidental gun

insurers argued that a third person, Walters,

killed so that the claimants could fake that as Hillmon's death, in order to

collect the insurance

money. To prove

that Walters

accompanied Hillmon

Creek, where the killing had occurred, the insurers offered two

wrote to his

sister

and

there with Hillmon.

The

fiance, respectively.

The United

States

letters

letters indicated that

Supreme Court held

to

Crooked

which Walters

Walters was going

both

that

letters

were

admissible.

The exception, contained

Rule 803

in

Hillmon doctrine: statement of declarant's
consistent with that intent.

WEISSENBERGER.

first is

supra note 135 S. 803.12

109
'"

can be used to prove that he acted

However, two other points are implicated by a juxtaposition

of the rule with the Hillmon doctrine. The

'"

intent

basic thrust of the

(3), retains the

145 U.S. 285,295-296(1892)

the issue of whether

at

Hillmon endorsed

382: Passannanta, supra note 131 at

54

what Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick term backward looking
example the declarant
prior agreement,

between the declarant and X,

of the Hillmon doctrine would permit
its

have dinner with

asserts that he will

its

is

For

tomorrow. This implies a

have dinner tomorrow.

and therefore

this implication

survival under present doctrine. This

statements of memory or belief from

to

X

inferences."'''

A

broad reading

raise the question

of

because Rule 803 (3) expressly excludes

scope. '^^

The other point

is

whether a declarant's

statement of intent can be used to prove subsequent act attributed to someone other than
the declarant.

The

resolution of the

an answer which Professor

issue lies in

first

Weissenberger surprisingly offers for the second point. '^^ That

backward looking inference as non hearsay. Since intention
determining whether conduct

Hillmon principle

that

is

is

is

the dispositive factor in

a statement'^^ and consequently hearsay, the aspect of the

backward looking does not qualify

is

grounded on the simple basis
he intends to communicate,

is

the treatment of the

that

what

uppermost

is

his future act.

It is

as

in the declarant's

statement.This

is

mind, and which

fortuitous that the statement of present

intent implies a previous act.

The use of the
is

clearly indefensible.

It

is

declarant's statement of intent to implicate another person

even doubtful whether

doctrine. In Hillmon the crucial issue
killing.

was

it

is

supported by the Hillmon

the presence of the declarant at the scene of the

His prior declaration that he was going to that scene was properly admitted.

164

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

'^^

See Marshal v Commonwealth Aquarium, 611 F.2d

supra note 33

S.8.38 at 935

1

(1st Cir.

1979) (declarant's

recounting of previous conversation was held not to be statement of present
intent)
'^^

"^

Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles
64 Temp. L. Rev. 145(1991)

:

See Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) (2)

An Essay on Federal Rule Evidence 803

(3),

55

Cases'^^

which have sought

to use a declarant's statement

of intent as evidence

subsequent to the statement, another person acted in a particular

and do
is

set a

dangerous precedent. The prior agreement implicit

not conclusive of the other person's subsequent

conduct.

way

that,

are simply unfair

in the statement

of intent

People do change their

minds.
Professor Weissenberger suggests that the use of a statement of intent in
this

maimer can be

rationalized

on the basis of

treating such statement as

two

fold,

one

admissible under Rule 803 (3) and the other as non hearsay.'^'' The crucial question

whether the declarant,

at the

is

time of the statement, could have had personal knowledge

of another person's subsequent conduct. Whether treated as hearsay or non hearsay, an
interpretation

which leads

The
necessity.

to such illogical reliance

on the statement ought

rationale'^" for the exception is

Such statement

is

likely to

founded

be accurate as

it

exists. Besides, the declarant is in the best position to

be argued that the contemporaneity requirement,
(1)

and

(2),

does not eliminate fabrication. This

difficult to verify the existence, or otherwise,

A
Some

related exception

is

is

in both trustworthiness

made while

know

his state

the state of

of mind. But

in this instance unlike

is

to be rejected.

and

mind
it

can

under Rules 801

because the declarant knows that

it is

of the particular state of mind.

that for purposes

of medical diagnosis or treatment.

regard this as also deriving from the res gestae doctrine.'^' Under Rule 803 (5)

"' People V Alcalde. 148 P.2d

374-380 (9th
intent

Cir.

627 (Cal.1944); United States v Pheaster. 544 F.2d 353.

1976) but some cases have held that a declarant's statement of

under Rule 803(3) cannot be used

to

prove another person's subsequent

act,

see United States V Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331, 1335-1336 and n.2 (9th Cir.

1982); United States V Jenkins, 579 F. 2d 840, 842- 844 (4th Cir. 1978)
'^"^

See Glen Weissenberger, supra note 166

""MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK.
171

supra note 33 S. 8.36

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 135

S.

803.18

at

391

at

924
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statements

made

for purposes

of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible

if

they

describe medical history, or past or present symptons, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment.

B.

'^^

The Res Gestae Exception

in Nigeria

The common law doctrine of
account for this position. In the

first

res gestae applies in Nigeria.Two reasons

place, as earlier mentioned, the

Evidence Act, by

opposed

virtue of Section 5, allows the continued application of inclusionary, as

to

exclusionary, rules of evidence which were in force prior to the enactment of the Act.

Since the

common law

doctrine of res gestae enabled the admissibility of evidence and

operated in the country before the inception

There

is

of the Act, Section 5 saves the doctrine.

judicial authority to the effect that the English doctrine of res gestae applies in

Nigeria.'^''

Secondly, the Evidence Act contains provision wide enough to subsume res

gestae. This

is

Section 7 of the Act which states that:

Facts which, though not in issue are so connected with a fact in issue as to

form part of the same transaction, are relevant whether they occurred

same time and place or

For evidence

to admissible as

with the fact in issue. Thus xn

"' Id

S.803.18

-

S. 803.21,

at different

times and places.

forming part of the res gestae,

R

v

Bang Weyeku, '

"'

R

V

Inc.,

570

F.

2d

1

(

604

084 (2nd

Bang Weyeku, (1943) 9 W.A C.A
361) 226

^-^

the

it

must be contemporaneous

West African Court of Appeal,

390-397; See also United States v Iron Shell, 633

(8th Cir. 1980); United States v Nick,

Dobbs Houses,

at the

195;

F.

2d

Cir.

Akpan

1

1

F.

978)

v State, (1994) 8 N.Wl.R.

Nigerian Court of Appeal alluded to the res gestae doctrine)

"'(1943)9W.A.C.A. 195

2d 77

199 (9th Cir. 1979); O'Gee v

(

Part
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following the English case of

R

v Beddingfield,^^^ held that the statement

me",which was made by the deceased

was because,

inadmissible. This

The

first is

after

the court reasoned that,

the fact in issue. '^^ In addition such statement

Two

shortly

critical issues

it

he

had been

stabbed,

must explain the

fact in issue.

emerge from the application of res gestae
is

time and place with the fact in issue or

is

relevant whether

at different

in Nigeria.

considerable agreement

wider than the English doctrine oi res gestae^^\ This

provision itself Under the section, the fact

was

was not contemporaneous with

the scope of section 7 of the Evidence Act. There

that the section is

"Bang has shot

it

is

clear

from the

occurred at the same

times and places. This removes the

requirement of contemporaneity and ought to distinguish the provision from the

common

law doctrine of res gestae. Yet the neglect of the section and the continued judicial
recourse to the res gestae doctrine robs contemporary evidence jurisprudence of guidance

and

stultifies legal

stricture

development. While the provision dispenses with the

common

law

of contemporaneity, does that completely eliminate the issue of time or does the

requirement of connection with the fact in issue operate to retain some form of time

frame even

if

a liberal one? These are important questions but unfortunately answers are

lacking as courts

still

rely

on res gestae.

The second

issue

is

more fundamental and

is

the question whether section

7 actually provides an exception to the hearsay rule. There

does."* This

175

'^^

(1879) 14

is

is

the assumption that

it

based on the premise that a statement falling within the section or

Cox C.C.

341; 70 L.T. 867

Contrast with Salawu v State (1971)

1

me". The witness rushed into the

The court admitted

N.M.L. R. 249 (deceased said "Sule is killing
room and saw the deceased in a pool of blood.

the statement "Sule

is

killing

me"

as part oires gestae.)

'"

AGUDA,

''*

Most writers allude to it as an exception to the rule. The Nigerian Law Reform
Commisssion includes it in its list of exceptions to the hearsay rule ( See
Workshop Papers on the Reform of the Evidence Act supra note 52 at 63) But

supra note 49

at

29

58

qualifying as res gestae

who made
relevant.

who

heard the statement,

that

in court witness other than the

what the section does

fact itself requiring proof, the

is

is to

person

make such statement

evidence of the in court witness

thus admissible as being direct on the point. This problem

is

of the absence of a conceptual treatment of hearsay under the Evidence

effects

Much

by an

be reported

however arguable

It is

Being a relevant

one of the
Act.

it.

may

Although current reform

to inference.

is left

efforts recognise the

need for

express provision on the hearsay rule, the Draft Evidence Decree retains the provision of
section 7

which

re-enacted as section 4.

is

appears that evidence admissible under the United States Federal Rules

It

of Evidence 803

(1),

803(2)

and some parts of 803(3) are admissible under the robust

doctrine aires gestae and under section 7 of Evidence Act.

and excited utterance exceptions

by

are,

The present sense impression

their very nature, intertwined

with the event or

condition which they describe or explain, in the case of present sense impression, or to

which they

relate, in the case

connected with the
correspondence
doubtful

if

is

fact

of excited utterance. Therefore they would equate facts so
issue

in

as

to

form part of the same tranaction.

understandable. Both exceptions have their roots in res gestae.

statements of declarant's then existing state of

or plan

would qualify

may be

admitted under section

mind

It

is

relating to future conduct

as res gestae or under section 7 of the Nigerian Act.

1

This

However they

6 of the Act, which seems in pari materia with Federal

Rule of Evidence 803(3). The section provides:

Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention,

knowledge, goodfaith, negligence, rashness,

illwill,

or goodwill towards

any particular person, or showing the existence of any
bodily feeling, are relevant

body or bodily

feeling

Aguda would seem

AGUDA,

to

is

state

of body or

the existence of any such state of mind or

in issue or relevant.

doubt

supra note 49

the section)

when

at

if

29

(

the section

is

an exception to the hearsay

rule.

See

asserting that declarations are not admissible under

59

One can

safely assert that the exceptions, in both jurisdictions, relating to

res gestae are similar although sections 7 and

1

6 of the Nigerian Act are wider than their

equivalents under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

gestae

still

applies in Nigeria in

its

streamlined the doctrine and broken
exceptions. There

doctrine as

is

is

Furthermore, while the doctrine of res

vague form, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
it

down

into certain easily ascertainable specific

every reason to suggest the itemised delimitation of the res gestae

done by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

If the

hearsay rule has been eroded

by many exceptions, the vague exception of res gestae seems
rule.

By

to totally

emasculate the

streamlining the doctrine into specific narrow exceptions, the useful aspects of

the doctrine can be retained while the vagueness and ambiguity, associated with

abandoned. This will prove an especially worthwhile venture
ambiguity that

C.

is

if

one realises

that

it,

it is

are

such

the cause of the vilification of the doctrine.

Some Hearsay Exceptions Contained

in

Documents

Fourteen of the twenty four exceptions contained in Federal Rule of

Evidence 803 necessarily have

to

be contained in documents. Three of these are

considered here. These are Recorded recollection (Rule 803 (5)

conducted activity(Rule 803 (6)

'^'^

Others are records of vital

)

),

Records of regularly

and Public records and reports (Rule 803 (8)

statistics

(Rule 803

(9));

)}^'^

records of religious organizations

(Rule 803 (11)); marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates (Rule 803 (12));
family records (rule 803(13)); records of documents affecting an interest in
property (Rule 804 (14)); statements in documents affecting an interest in

property (Rule 803 (15)); statements in ancient documents (Rule 803 (16));

market reports, commercial publications (Rule 803
803

(18));

(17));

judgment of previous conviction (Rule 803

Learned Treatises (Rule

(22));

judgment

as to

personal, family, or general history, or boundaries (Rule 803 (23)). Rule 803(7)

and Rule 803 (10) may also be viewed as documentary but the relation to
documents is indirect as they merely allow evidence to prove absence of entry or
record in specified documents.
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i.

Recorded ReCollection
According

The following
declarant

to

Rule 803

by the hearsay

are not excluded

available

is

(5)

as

witness

a

rule,

even though the

A memorandum

:(5)

record

or

concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now
has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the

memory and to reflect that knowledge
memorandum or record may be read into

matter was fresh in the witness'
If admitted,

correctly.

evidence but

may

the

not itself "be received as an exhibit unless offered by an

adverse party.

It

is

curious

why

this exception is contained in

Rule 803 which deals with exceptions

where the declarant need not be unavailable. The
invocation of the exception

that

is

it

first

foundational requirement for the

must be shown

that the witness lacks a present

means

recollection of the matter recorded'*^. This

that

he

is

physically present. But Rule

804, which deals with exceptions applicable only where the declarant

gives unavailability a broad definition which includes "lack of

matter of the declarant's statement". The result

under Rule 803,

in actuality, to

804 exceptions. Rule 803

is

The

even

'^'

182

In

reflect the prior

Re Corrugated Antitrust

WEISSENBERGER,
Id

the subject

further effect of this special treatment

stricter in the

(5) is confined to

comes

is

one form of unavailability.
is

that the record or

declarant.'^'

memorandum

Thirdly, the record or

or adopted by the declarant'*' and, finally,

Litigation,

supra note 135

756 F.2d 41

S.

that the

case of Rule 803(5), for, unlike Rule

knowledge of the

memorandum must have been made
'^'^

memory of

that although the exception

is

The second foundational requirement
must correctly

unavailable,

succeed under the exception, the proponent must establish

a particular form of unavailability.

requirement of unavailability

is

803.22

at

1

(5th Cir.1985)

400

it

must
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have been made or adopted
declarant's

which a witness may refresh
under Rule 612 the writing
evidence.'^''

record or

the matter in question

was

an extension of Federal Rule of Evidence 612 under

is

his

is

memory by

refering to a writing.

used just to jog the

However, the

memorandum may

memory of

The

difference

rationalize. If jurors

can

be read into evidence but

why

that

of Rule 803(5) to the effect that the

later provision

listen to its contents,

is

the witness and does not

may

not itself be received as

exhibit unless offered by an adverse party'^^ befogs this distinction and

The caveat

fresh in the

memory'^\
This exception

become

when

a time

at

can't the

is difficult to

document be used

as exhibit?

serves no purpose.

One

interesting feature of the exception

the establishment of the foundational requirements.

through the declarant himself Perhaps

this is the

is

the centrality of the declarant in

Most of these have

to

be established

reason the drafters chose to categorize

the exception as one not requiring proof of unavailability.

The exception
because the alternative
the facts.

It is

is

informed by both necessity and

may be no

evidence

at all since the declarant

reliable because the record or

matter was fresh in the declarant's memory.
is

physically available, he

may be

cross

reliability. It is

no longer remembers

memorandum was made
It

may

at

a time

examined although

it is

Id

184

United States v Rinke, 11%

•''

Clark V City of Los Angeles, 650

F.

2d 581 (10th Cir.1985)
F.

2d

1 1

82 (9th

when

the

also be argued that since the declarant

doubtful

how

cross examination will be, in view of the declarant's claim of lack of memory.

'«^

necessary

Cir.

1981)

useful such
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ii.

Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
This exception

The following
declarant
activity.

is

A

contained in Rule 803 (6) which states:

is

by the hearsay

are not excluded

available as a witness

memorandum,

:

(6)

even though the

rule,

Records of regularly conducted

any form,

report, record or data compilation, in

of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made

at or

near the time

by or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if

if

kept in

was

it

the

make the memorandum, report,
shown by the testimony of the custodian

regular practice of that business activity to
record, or data compilation,

all

as

or other qualified witness, unless the source of the information or the

method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation,

whether or not conducted for

For admissibility under

made

in the course

regularly

made

this rule,

it

profit.

has to be shown that the record or other document was

of a regularly conducted

in the activity.

It is

suggested that the requirement

and calling of every kind,

doubtful

is to

show

if

activity'*^

by "regular"

and the record
is

meant

routine.

such

in the course

activities that

It

is

is

has been

that "the activity recorded is a type

regularly occurs in the course of the business" day to day activity"'^^ This
to include

such as

is

which

wide enough

do not occur frequently but which do occur once

in a

while

of that type of business. Secondly, the record must have been made by a

person with knowledge of the

act,

event or condition. This condition

is

also satisfied

where the maker of the document did so from information supplied by a person with such
knowledge'^^. In the

latter situation the

been under a business duty

"'

person

who

supplied the information must have

to give the information. Thirdly, the record

MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE A
206(1 989)
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT, VOLUME
1

'«Md
1

must have been

WEISSENBERGER,

supra note 135

S.

803. 28, 408-409

,
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made

at

must be
witness.

or near the time of the transaction to which
laid

it

relates.

'^^

Finally, these foundations

by the testimony of the custodian of the record or

that

of other qualified

190

The

rationale for the exception

was

initially

based on necessity but

the exception also appeals to reliability because the regularity and precision with

such records are kept guarantee accuracy. This

is

iii.

which

strengthened by the fact that

important for the functioning of business that accurate records be

now

it

is

kept.'^'

Public Records and Reports

By Rule 803

The following
declarant

(8),

by the hearsay

are not excluded

available as a witness

is

:

rule,

even though the

Public records and reports. Records,

reports, statements, or data compilations, in

any form, of public offices or

agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)

matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters

was

however in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
there

a duty to report, excluding

circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

This rule creates three classes of exceptions relating to records of public offices or
agencies. In the

first class,

are records of the activities of such offices or agencies.

distinguishing feature of this class
offices or agencies.

"' Id;

GRAHAM,

The second

supra note

"'WEISSENBERGER,
'^•id

1

86

is

that the records deal with internal activities

class deals with records

at

207

supra note 135

S.

803.28, 408-409

The

of the

of matters observed by such

offices or agencies in the discharge of their legal duties. Unlike records in the first

category, these focus on facts outside the office or agency. However, the rule excludes the
admissibility, in criminal cases, of records of matters observed

by police officers and

"other law enforcement personnel", an expression which has been given a broad
interpretation to include "any officer or

law enforcement

responsibilities".'^^

employee of a governmental agency which has

The

findings resulting from an investigation

third class allows the admissibility

made pursuant

to authority granted

of factual

by law. Such

findings are admissible in civil cases. But in criminal cases they are admissible only
against the Government.

The exclusion of the use of the second and

against an accused person in a criminal case

is

third categories

geared towards avoiding the constitutional

question of right of confrontation.

The two

recurring rationales, for the exceptions to the hearsay rule, are

reflected in this exception. Practical necessity dictates the use of public records

reports instead of an insistence

on

live

and

testimony from public officers. Such insistence

will not only be inconvenient but also disruptive

of public administration.'''^ Similarly,

because the public officer acts without any motive for bias, the records are presumed to

be free from the hearsay danger of fabrication. Besides, the routine nature of some of the
records ensures their accuracy.'^"

D. Exceptions relating to Documentary Hearsay in Nigeria

The
803

nearest analogue, under Nigerian law, to Federal Rule of Evidence

(5) (recorded recollection) is the provision contained in Section 91

Act. This provision applies in civil proceedings.

"'

United States v Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d

'"

WEISSENBERGER,

194

Id

Cir.

The

of the Evidence

section allows the admissibility of

1977)

supra note 135 S. 803.40 at 425
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any statement made, by a person,

in a

document and tending

could be proved by direct oral evidence.

Two

conditions must be met.

document must have had personal knowledge of
deals or must have

made

supplied by a person

knowledge of those

document

the

who

in the

the

performance of a duty to record information

Secondly, the maker of the document has to be called as

maker

of bodily or mental condition, to attend court as a witness, or
not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or

him have been made without
is

The maker of

had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal

matters. '^^

Section 91

which

which the statement

the matters with

a witness. But this condition need not be satisfied if the

it is

to establish a fact

success.

dead, or unfit, by reason

is

if

if all

he

is

beyond the seas and

reasonable efforts to find

'^^

the broadest provision under

which documentary hearsay can

be received. Such documents can be public'^^ or private. However, while Rule 803 (5) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence

applicable only in civil cases.

would require

the

its

Another point of divergence

deals. Section 9 1

is

that

to lack a present recollection

is

where Rule 803(5)
of the matter with

would admit the document even though the maker

contents. Unlike the business records exception contained in Federal Rule of

Evidence 803

made

'''^

not limited to any particular proceeding, Section 91

maker of a document

which the document
recalls

is

(6),

Section 91 of the Nigerian Act does not require that the document be

in the course

of a regularly conducted

between the two. This

is

activity.

There

is

an important similarity

the explicit caution against admissibility

where the sources of

information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Section 91 goes

•''Section 91 (l)(a)

"'Section 91 (l)(b)
'^^

See Andrews v Cordiner, 1947 K.B. 655 (public document was admitted under an
equivalent provision in an English statute)

"' Lilley v Petit,
(1946) K.B. 401
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further to specify such circumstance of untrustworthiness.

any statement made by a person interested,

at

anticipated, involving a dispute as to any

precludes admissibility of

when proceedings were pending

or

which the statement might tend

to

a time
fact

It

establish.''^

Although there

is

no specific exception, under Nigerian law, dealing with

business records. Section 37 of the Act provides for the admissibility of entries in books

of account, regularly kept

in the course

of business. This provision

than Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (6) because, unlike the

latter,

it

is

more

restrictive

applies only to books

of account. Moreover, such entries are not sufficient evidence to charge any person with
liability. In

otherwords they have to be corroborated.
Section 38 of the Nigerian Evidence Act contains an exception comparable

to Federal

Rule of Evidence 803

An

(8). It

provides:

entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a

fact in issue or relevant fact

of his

official duty, or

and made by a public servant

by any other person

specially enjoined by the law of the country in

or record

is

kept,

is itself

This public record exception
important respects.

As

that the record or report
in the rule.

unless the

hand there

earlier

is

a relevant

different

to

is

is

discharge

which such book,

register

from the Federal Rules of Evidence model
(8) is circumscribed

in

by the requirement

brought under one of the three categories contained

Moreover, for two of such categories, admissibility

document

in the

performance of a duty

fact."°^

shown. Rule 803

must have

in

is

restricted to civil cases

tendered against the Government in criminal cases.

On

the other

nothing on the face of Section 37 to suggest any distinction between

civil

and criminal proceedings. Does the section therefore permit the admissibility of police

"'Section 91 (3)
^°*^

This section was applied in Onyeanwusi v Okukpara, (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 21
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reports in criminal cases?

hearsay.

The

The problem with such

reports are usually based

reports

jurisdictions.

As a

that they involve multiple

on information supplied by

does not provide for admissibility of multiple hearsay. This

between the two

is

result, police reports

is

others. Nigerian

law

another point of distinction

cannot

come under

Section 37.

Furthermore, Section 35 A of the Nigerian Act makes specific provision for police reports

and

it

is

a recognised principle of interpretation that specific provisions override general

ones.2°'

Therefore, even though Section 37
police reports,

it

must yield

may

appear wide enough to encompass

to the specific provision in Section 3 5 A.

This specific

provision gives the court a discretion, in a criminal case, to admit the written statement of

an investigating police officer where the attendance of such officer cannot be procured.

The caveat

is

that such

admission can only be done where the defence does not object to

the statement.""" Here again there

The

is

limitation contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) operates to exclude

police reports^°^ while Section 35

does not object.

'°'

a convergence of United States law and Nigerian law.

A

achieves a similar result except where the defence

^°''

Schroder v Mayor, (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. Part \\Akpan v
27, 225

State, (1986) 3

N.W.L.R. Part

'°'Section35A(a)
'"'

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

^"^

Other exceptions, to the hearsay

supra note 33 S.8.49

rule, relating to contents

for in Section 41 (dealing with certificates

78(dealing with affidavits)

at
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of documents are provided

by certain public

officers)

and Section

CHAPTER

IV

EXCEPTIONS REQUIRING PROOF OF UNAVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT
A. Uavailability under the Federal Rules of Evidence

The previous chapter examined some hearsay exceptions which apply
whether or not the declarants are available. In contradistinction
Federal

to those exceptions.

Rule of Evidence 804 contains exceptions the applicability of which

is

conditioned on a showing of the declarants' unavailability. However, unavailability

is

defined in an elastic manner and covers five situations.

The
court,

first is

on the ground of

declarant's statement."*^'
it.

This

is

privilege,

waived

it

would

get

is

It

personal to the witness. But

all

The second
reftising to testify

it

is

from such assertion of privilege

seems the law

privilege he does so for

exempted by a ruling of the

the privilege before the court can rule

by making the declaration which

in court testimony.

is

from testifying concerning the subject matter of the

The witness must claim

because the privilege

benefit the witness
earlier

a situation where the declarant

is

is

to

on

an open question what

if

he had, presumably,

be tendered in the absence of his

not prepared to hold that if a person waives his

times.
situation of unavailability is

where the declarant

persists in

concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an

order of the court to do

so.^'*'^

While a witness who disobeys a court order may be subject

to

punishment for contempt, such punishment would not substitute the evidence required

^°^

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1); See United States v MacClosky, 682 F.2d 468 (4th
Cir.

1982) (witness asserted privilege against self incrimination); United States v

Lilley,

581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978) (witness asserted marital relationship

privilege)
^°^

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(2)
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in the case. Federal

Rule of Evidence 804(a)(2) caters for such lacuna.

proponent to use any of the hearsay exceptions contained
Thirdly, a witness

is

unavailable

subject matter of his prior statement.""^ This
It

may be

susceptible to abuse as witnesses

is

who

the

in the rule.^"''

testifies to

most

enables a

It

a lack of

memory of the

delicate heading of unavailability.

may make bogus

claims to lack of

memory

as

a ploy to avoid cross examination. But the characterization of this situation as one of
unavailability has been justified

Rule 804(a)(3)
this

on the ground

rejects the

argument

that:

that

an assertion of lack of memory in

context invites perjury from witnesses

impeached or cross examined as
adopts the

modem

who

seek to avoid being

to the subject matter. Instead, the

position that the value of the admission of the hearsay

statements outweighs the danger arising from the potential for perjury.

It

is

on the basis of a claim of lack of memory.

The
statement

is

fourth situation, evidencing unavailability,

unable to be present or to testify

unavailability in both legal and literal terms.

is

the

most extreme case of

the otherhand, an illness or infirmity,

United States v Carlson, 547 F 2d 1346 (8th

2d 1141 (4th

Cir.

Cir. 1977);

United States v Garner, 51

1978)

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3); See United States v MacDonald. 688 F.2d 224
(4th Cir. 1982); United States v Davis, 551 F.2d

^°^

where the declarant of a

not be absolute and therefore the court would have to consider other alternatives to a

F.
^°'

On

is

hearing because of death or then

at the

existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. ''° Death

^''^

'°^

suggested that the court has to be especially careful in making a finding of

unavailability

may

Rule

Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804

:

233 (8th

Cir.

1977)

Admissible Hearsay from an

Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1079, 1084 (1987)
^'°

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4); See Mattox v United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)

(dead declarant held unavailable); United States v Hughes, 422 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir.
1

969) (witness

who had psychiatric

condition was held unavailable)
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finding of unavailability. If the illness or infirmity

be to grant a continuance.^" In the same vein,
physically attend court, arrangement

he

may

is

not permanent, a viable option

if the

may

declarant can testify but cannot

be made to take his evidence

at the place

where

is.2'2

The
hearsay statement

last

is

situation of unavailability arises

absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been

unable to procure his attendance

(

or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision

(b) (2) (3) or (4), his attendance or testimony)

For a finding of unavailability under

made
will

where the declarant of the

by process or other reasonable means.^'^

this heading, the

proponent has to show that he has

"'''
reasonable efforts to procure the attendance of the witness.

What

is

reasonable

depend on the circumstances of each case and the standard may be higher

in a

criminal case than in a civil one.

An

interesting feature of this heading of unavailability is the requirement

that in addition to the effort to procure the attendance

should

make

efforts to obtain his testimony. This additional requirement is limited to

exceptions under Rule 804 (b)

(2), (3)

and

absent from the hearing but his evidence
unavailable and his evidence
deposition. Is

of the declarant, the proponent

it

is

is

(4).

is

that

where a witness

obtained through deposition, the witness

admissible.

hearsay or non hearsay? If

The implication

it

A

conceptual question

is

viewed as nonhearsay, does

is

is

is

not

the nature of the

with the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c) as " a statement other than one

that

comport

made by

the

'" Peterson v United States,

344 F. 2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965) ( pregnancy is only a
temporary incapacity and a short continuance might have been requested)

^'^

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209

2'^

Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) (5)

^"

Government of Canal Zone v Pinto, 590
U.S. 719(1968)

at

1086

F.

2d 1344 (5th

Cir. 1979);

Barber v Page, 90

71

declarant while testifying at the

some of the paraphenalia of a
especially as the jury

It is

arguable that a deposition has

court hearing but that does not equate

absent.

is

or hearing..." ?

trial

It is

more

to a court hearing

it

like admissible hearsay in the nature

of prior

testimony.

Another issue
(a) (2),

is

the relationship between refusal to testify, under Rule

and absence from hearing, under Rule 804

(a) (5).

A

declarant

who

is

804

served with

a subpoena but does not attend court can logically be construed as refusing to testify. If
this

analysis

is

correct,

it

means a proponent of hearsay evidence may avoid

the

additional requirement, contained in Rule 804 (a) (5), by relying on Rule 804 (a) (2)

which does not impose the additional burden of making

efforts to obtain the declarant's

testimony. Nonetheless, the additional requirement, contained in Rule 804 (a) (5)

aimed

at

making the proponent

to take the declarant's deposition

deposition in preference to a hearsay statement
In

all

of unavailability

situation

and offering such

.^'^

the five instances of unavailability, there

if the

is

is

a preclusion of a finding

due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the

is

proponent of the hearsay statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying.^'^ This preclusion

cannot be allowed to benefit from his

B. Unavailability

Under

is

of course based on the principle that a party

own wrong.

the Nigerian Evidence Act

The Evidence Act does not contain a
But some of the exceptions, analogous
804, are predicated on

some form of

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

^'^

Federal Rule of Evidence 804

to those contained in Federal

unavailability. Unlike

standard of unavailability uniform for

'"

specific provision

all

on

unavailability.

Rule of Evidence

Rule 804, which makes the

the exceptions contained in the rule, the

supra note 33, S.8.56 at 1011
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Evidence Act has only one broad situation of unavailability applicable to

all

the

exceptions, while the others are peculiar to a particular exception.

The

situation of unavailability applicable to all the hearsay exceptions is

death. Section 33 of the Evidence

Act makes statements, made by a person who

judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized

Section 34 the previous evidence

found or

when

is

is

later stage

admissible

incapable of giving evidence, or

is

dead,

makes evidence given by a witness

relevant in six situations, while Section 34

subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a

is

by law

to take

it,

in a

relevant in a

of the same proceeding. In the case of

when

the witness

kept out of the

his presence cannot be obtained without an

is

way by

dead or cannot be

the adverse party, or

amount of delay or expense which

is

unreasonable.

Whereas, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, privilege, refusal to
lack of

memory,

hearing are

all

inability to testify arising

from

illness or infirmity,

testify,

and absence from

grounds for the invocation of the hearsay exceptions of dying declaration,

former testimony, statement against

interest,

statement of personal or family history,

these grounds cannot justify use of similar exceptions under the Nigerian Evidence Act.

However,

in the

narrow context of former testimony,

situation that will lead to a finding of unavailability, under Federal
(5) (absence

from hearing or

trial)

it

appears that a

Rule of Evidence 804

would, under the Nigerian Act, lead to a finding that

the witness cannot be found or that his presence

would occasion an unreasonable delay or

expense.^'^ Furthermore, inability to be present or to testify because of physical or mental
illness or infirmity

may

be treated as incapacity to give evidence under the Evidence

Act.^'* In similar fashion, if a witness is kept out

217

See Section 34 (1) of the Evidence Act

^'Md

of the way by an adverse party,

this

may
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qualify under the Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) as a refusal to testify or indeed

absence from the hearing.^''

Two

situations of unavailability, under Federal

Rule of Evidence, do not

have counterparts under Nigerian law. These are privilege and lack of memory of subject
matter.

The panacea

for lack of

refresh the witness' memory.'^"

memory of

The writing

The point must be made

subject matter

is

all

the use of prior writing to

not offered as substantive evidence.

that the Draft

the standard of unavailability uniform for

is

Evidence Decree attempts

the exceptions. This,

it

scope of the situations stated in Section 34 of the Evidence Act."'

to

make

does by widening the

It

will be recalled that

under existing law these situations are limited to the exception for former testimony.

However

if the

Draft Evidence Decree

is

adopted those situations of unavailability will

extend to such exceptions as statement against

interest,

statements

made

in the

course of a

business and statements relating to the existence of a relationship.

C.

Former Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (1) states:

The following

are not excluded

by the hearsay rule

if the

declarant

is

Former Testimony - Testimony given as a
witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
unavailable as witness

another proceeding,

:

(1)

if the

party against

whom

the testimony

offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest,

is

now

had an

opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.

^" Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) (2) and
(5)
^^°

Section 216 of the Nigerian Evidence Act

^^'

See Section 35 of the Draft Evidence Decree
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Besides a showing of unavailability, for hearsay evidence to be admissible under this
exception,

it

must be shown

proceeding or in a deposition.

It

that the prior evidence

was given

It

a hearing of a

has been suggested that "proceeding" should be given an

expansive meaning to include every process where oath and the other
present.^^^

in

must also be shown

opponent

that the hearsay

or, if

it

trial

is

safeguards are

a civil case, his

predecessor in interest had the opportunity to develop the hearsay testimony by direct,
cross,

or redirect examination. This implies that evidence of a witness in a prior

proceeding may, in a
earlier proceeding.

later

And

redirect examination. If

proceeding, be used against the party

this is so

whether the evidence was

was given

the evidence

who

called

him

elicited in direct, cross or

in direct or redirect examination, the

party must be taken to have utilized the opportunity to develop the testimony. If

given in cross examination, then

much

will turn

in the

it

was

on whether the party had an adequate

opportunity to explore the evidence in redirect examination.

A

similar analysis attends

evidence given by a witness called by a party other than the hearsay opponent. For such
evidence to be receivable under Rule 804 (b)

(1),

it

must be shown

that the hearsay

had an opportunity

sufficient

"to render the conduct of cross examination or the decision not to cross

examine

opponent, or his predecessor in

meaningful in the

light

interest, if the

case

is civil,

of the circumstances"^'^ which prevailed in the prior proceeding.

In a criminal case, former testimony cannot be used against a defendant

unless he

be used

was a

in favor

party to the prior proceeding.

It is

not clear whether prior testimony can

of a defendant where the prosecutor

the subsequent one. For instance suppose a defendant
federal prosecutors

'2^

and

is

at

1096;

Given the

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,

CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

from

prosecuted by a state and later by

that the facts giving rise to both prosecutions overlap.

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209
supra note 33, S.8.58 at 1016

"' E.

in the earlier case is different

S.255, 761-62 (3d ed 1984)
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language of Rule 804 (b)

(1),

evidence given in the state prosecution

against the federal prosecutors as the latter

may

not be used

would not have had an opportunity

testimony given in a proceeding to which they were not a party. Even
that the state prosecutors

may

if

it

be treated as having similar motive

to

develop

can be argued
develop the

to

testimony, as the federal prosecutors have in the subsequent case, the rule limits such
analysis to civil cases. Thus, on the face Rule 804 (b) (1) former testimony

may

not be

admitted in favor of a defendant where the two proceedings involve different prosecutors.

However

this

may

interpretation

plain

yield

constitutional

to

due

process

considerations.^"^^

In

accommodates

cases the rule

civil

a

scenario

where the hearsay

opponent's predecessor had the opportunity to develop the testimony. In such case the
previous testimony

is

admissible against the hearsay opponent. The "predecessor in

language, used by the rule,

interest"

interpretation, limiting

it

to prior parties with

whom

a liberal interpretation, to include every party

testimony

is

develop testimony
requirement.

In

is

other words,

after

was a predecessor

is

It is

whose

made

interest or

A

careful reading of

from the rule
(to

be

motive to develop the

laid) to the

interest

to

the

hearsay

Rule 804

to

"predecessor in interest"
in

opponent,

the

previous

a

separate

as to whether such predecessor's motive, in regard to the

similar to that of the hearsay opponent in the instant case. Indeed

was a

224

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209

^^'

Id at

100; See also Dykes v

(b)

of motive

that similarity

a determination that the party

in

possible that the hearsay opponent

1

clear

an additional foundation

determination has to be
testimony,

the hearsay opponent had privity, or

similar to that of the hearsay opponent.^"^

(1) rejects the latter interpretation.

proceeding

be susceptible to either a narrow

said to

is

party to the

at 11

case. This, in

and of

Inc, 801 F.

2d 810 (6th

Cir.

is

itself,

05

Raymark Industries,

(adopting the liberal interpretation)

first

it

1986)
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should not conclude the matter.

develop the testimony

It

has to be determined whether his motive to

still

in the previous case coincides

to interpret "predecessor in interest" in terms

is

to confuse the

Rule 804

with his present motive. Therefore

of similarity of motive to develop testimony

two foundational requirements and

that

does violence to the language of

"Predecessor in interest" envisages some form of legal succession or

(b) (1).

indeed subrogation to rights and obligations.

As

already mentioned, the hearsay opponent's motive (or in civil cases, his

predecessor in interest's) to develop the testimony in the previous case must be similar to

motive

his

in the

subsequent case. Similar motive

does require identical motive,^^^
cases, regarding the evidence,

it

seems

is

not particularly precise. Although

that the requirement is that his concerns, in both

must be the same. Similar motive appears

connotation than identity of issues. The issues for which the evidence

be the same

in

rationales

for

necessity and reliability.''' Since the declarant
had. Since prior testimony

presumed

is

to

have a wider

offered need not

both cases.

The underlying

it is

it

to

be

was given

reliable.

at

is

admissibility

of former testimony are

unavailable, his live testimony cannot be

a fair adversary hearing with

all trial

safeguards,

^^^

The Nigerian version of

the exception for former testimony

is

found

in

Section 34 of the Evidence Act. The section authorizes the reception of former testimony

where the witness
are

when

the witness

out of the

^^^

^^'

'''

unavailable on account of any of the situations earlier stated. These

is

way by

is

dead,

cannot be found,

at

incapable of giving evidence,

is

kept

the adverse party or his presence carmot be obtained without an

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209
Id

is

at

1

099

1095

CARLSON, IMWINKELRID AND KIONKA,

supra note 24

at

687

77
unreasonable delay or expense. In addition, other foundational facts are required. The

proponent has to show that
(a) the first

proceeding was between the same parties involved in the instant case or their

representatives in interest;
(b) the adverse party in the first proceeding

examine^^*^;

had the right and opportunity

and

questions in issue were substantially the same in the

(c) the

to cross

first

as in the second

proceeding.

The
proceedings, than
point

is

section
is

is

stricter,

on the question of the connection between both

the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Under Rule 804

the relationship of the hearsay opponent to the earlier case.

the proponent and the

first

case

is irrelevant.

(b) (1), the focal

The nexus between

But under Section 34 of the Nigerian Act,

not only must the hearsay opponent, or his representative in interest, be

been a party

to the previous case,

representative in interest,

more

was a

tolerant tenor of Rule

it

must also be established

party to the earlier case.

804

It is

(b) (1) is preferable as

it

shown

to

that the proponent, or his

however suggested

that the

caters for the concern for

fairness to the hearsay opponent without unduly excluding helpful evidence.

whereas

the Federal Rules of Evidence

make

have

Again

a distinction between criminal and civil

Section 34 of the Evidence Act does not distinguish between the forms of

cases,

proceedings.

Although Section 34

is

differently

language of "an opportunity and similar motive
or redirect examination",

had the

'" See
^'°

right

R

its

and opportunity

V Ijoma, (1961)

to

worded, from Rule 804

develop the testimony by

requirement that "the adverse party in the
to cross

ALL N.L.R.

See State v Friday, (1970-71)

1

examine"

is

518

E.C.S.L.R. 24

wide enough

to

first

(b)

(l)'s

direct, cross

proceeding

cover evidence elicited

78

from a witness, called by the hearsay opponent

whom

that the party against

the evidence

was given

opportunity to cross examine. This requirment
prior testimony

was given

at the instance

in the earlier case. All that is required is

may

in the earlier case

not even be insisted upon where the

of the hearsay opponent.

Another marked distinction between Rule 804
that the latter requires identity

must have had

and Section 34

(b) (1)

of issues in both the previous and the

is

whereas

later cases,

the former requires that the motive to develop the testimony should be similar in both
cases.

Rule 804

Section 34

D.

is

Dying

(b)

more

( 1 )

focuses more on the concern of the hearsay opponent while

legalistic

and therefore

stricter.

Declaration

The old common law exception

to

the hearsay rule,

known

declaration, finds expression, in a modified form, in Federal Rule of Evidence

which reads

as dying

804

(b) (2)

as follows:

The following

are not excluded

by the hearsay rule

if the

declarant

is

unavailable as a witness: (2) Statement under belief of impending death.In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a

statement

made by

a declarant while believing that the declarant's death

was imminent, concerning

the

cause or circumstances

of what the

declarant believed to be impending death.

At common law the dying declaration exception was limited

to

homicide cases. This was

severely criticised as being irrational since the underlying philosophy applies to other
cases. ^^'

Although commentators suggested the elimination of the

of the

restriction

exception to homicide cases. Rule 804 (b) (2) opts for a cautious approach and merely

extends

"'

the

See 5

J.

exception to

civil

cases

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

"where the stakes do not involve possible

IN TRIALS

(Chadboume ed 1974) 227 S285;

E.

AT COMMON LAW,

CLEARY,

SS 1436

supra note 223, S. 283

at

830

79

imprisonment""^^ while retaining

evidence

is

it

for

homicide cases "where exceptional need for the

present".^"

The declarant must have had personal knowledge of the matter asserted
and must have believed

that death

was

whether a particular declarant believed
reasonable
die.

man

However,

in

test is subjective

believe. ~^^

would so

and should be

was imminent, and not whether a

that his death

in the declarant's position

He can become

The

imminent.^^''

The declarant need not

unavailable in any of the other senses contained in Rule 804

homicide cases the declarant

is

usually dead, although there

is

(a).

nothing in the

language of the rule confining the use of the declaration to homicide cases involving the
death of the declarant. In other words, in principle,

by a declarant

in a trial for the

situation the declarant
that

it is

possible to use a statement

homicide of a person other than the declarant. But

must be shown

to

have been

in

apprehension of his

in that

death not

of the other person.

To be

admissible, the statement must relate to the cause or circumstances

of what the declarant believed

to

be impending death. Where the statement

description of the cause of perceived imminent death,
difficulty arises

where

it

relates to the circumstances

it

is

suffice?

It

is

usually simple to apply, but

would remote circumstances

has been suggested that the court should focus on the nexus between the time

Fed. R. Evidence 804 (b) (2) Advisory Committee Note

Hearsay Exceptions The Dying Declaration
19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 481 (1995)
-

:

;

See also Rick A. Howard,

Return to

its

Original Application,

"Md
^^"^

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209, 1 109-1 110; See also United States v Lemonakis,
485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ( suicide note, written six days before death, was
held inadmissible as there was no indication of apprehension of death)

^^^

a

of perceived impending death. Must

the particular circumstance relate directly to the death or

^^^

own

made

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209

at

1110

so

One may add

and circumstances of the event, and the expected death. ^''^
should exclude a declaration where the connection

that the court

remote.

is

Necessity, stemming from the unavailability of the declarant, informs the

use of this exception.""

The statement
want

meet

to

is

his

Where

the declarant

is

also considered reliable since

it

Maker with

a

lie

on

presumes a religious persuasion,
persists that psychological

possibility of falsehood. ^^^

The general

forces

Even

said that in a

is

which occur

principle

on which

made

death and

when every hope of

falsehood

is

silenced,

this

world

and the mind

is

is

in these

admitted

is at

is

words

that

when every motive

to

induced by the most powerful

considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which

is

(b) (2)'s equivalent,

the deceased:

""Id

1112

at

:

the point of

is

made by

in a court

under Nigerian law.
is

is

of justice.

^"^

Section 33(a) of the Evidence Act,

dead, relevant

when

the statement

1108

at

at

1107

MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
Weissenberger, supra note 209
stress

R

the party

gone:

is

this justification

secular world the thought

of evidence

when

which makes statements, made by a person who

240

more

argued that

considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful,

Rule 804

""

it is

the point of death eliminate the

at

this species

in extremity,

imposed by a positive oath administered

"'Id

if

Eyre C.B. articulated these considerations

they are declarations

"'Id

thought that a dying person would not

is

his lips."^*

it

dead such necessity becomes absolute.

may

supra note 33, S. 8.61 at 1033: But see Glen
at

1

107 for a suggestion that such psychological

cause flaws in perception and narration.

V Woodcock, (1789)

1

Leach 500

at

502: 168 E.R.353

is

81
as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the

which resuhed

transaction

in his death, in cases in

which the cause of that

comes into question; such statements are relevant only in
murder or manslaugter of the deceased person and only when

person's death
trials for

such person

at the

time of making such declaration believed himself to be

in danger of approaching death although he

time of making

it

declaration

is

limited to homicide cases.

is still

entertained at the

hopes of recovery.

The Nigerian version of dying
cases and

may have

more

And

restrictive.

It

not even to

all

does not apply to

civil

homicide cases, but

to

only those involving the death of the particular declarant and in which the cause or

circumstances of the transaction leading to such death are in issue.

of Evidence 804

(b) (2), the declarant

homicide

in a civil case or in a

trial

Under Federal Rule

need not be dead. His declaration

resulting

The

trial

resulting

be admitted

from the death of another person.

otherhand. Section 33 (a) applies only where the particular declarant
respect of a homicide

may

is

On

the

dead and only

in

from his death.

central consideration in both jurisdictions is the declarant's belief of

impending death. But while Rule 804

(b) (2) requires a belief that death is

imminent,

Section 33 (a) requires simply a belief in danger of approaching death. ^"^ Moreover, under

Nigerian law, the declarant

may

need not subjectively believe

entertain hopes of recovery.

in certainty

It

means

that the declarant

of imminent death. Rule 804 (b) (2) seems to

retain the old English requirement of "settled hopeless expectation

of death", ^'*" while

Section 33 (a) appears more liberal on this point. The qualification, under Section 33
that the declarant

may

entertain hopes of recovery

judicial attention.

It is

difficult to reconcile

approaching death. While one

'"

Kuse V The

State, (1969)

may

it

is

vague and has not received much

to the requirement

of belief in danger of

not urge the requirement of an absolute expectation of

N.M.L.R. 153 S.C.

;

Garba and Another

162
242

(a),

Shepardv United States, 290 U.S.

96, 99 (1933) (Justice Cardozo);

v R, (1959) 4 F.S.C.

82

death or belief in certainty of death, as appHes in the United States,

requirement of belief in "danger of approaching death"

it

is

suggested that the

sufficiently liberal

is

and should

not be further watered down.

The

strictures

imposed by the requirement of belief

in

danger of

approaching death and the confinement of dying declarations to homicide cases have

come under

criticisms.^"''

elimination of both

exception

is

As

a result, the Nigerian

It

is

conceded

that the scope

expanded. Most jurisdictions, including the United States,
civil cases.

This

is

justifiable

proposes the

This complete radical overhaul of the dying declaration

restrictions.^"''

hardly desirable.

Law Reform Commission

of the exception should be

now

because the underlying rationale,

apply the exception in

presumed

reliability, is

not peculiar to any proceeding. Thus the proposal to extend the exception to other

proceedings

is

welcome. But

to

remove the requirement

himself to be in danger of approaching death
This will rob dying declaration of
will be a free flow

its

is

that the declarant

to deprive the exception

must believe

of its substratum.

fundamental philosophical underpinning. The result

of reliable and unreliable hearsay under the guise of dying declaration.

E. Statements Against interest

Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (3) provides an exception, to the hearsay rule, in these
terms:

The following

are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant

unavailable as a witnes: (3) Statement against interest

which was

at the

time of

pecuniary or proprietary

its

making so

interest, or so far

.

-

A

statement

far contrary to the declarant's

tended to subject the declarant

to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim

by the declarant

against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position

not have

made

is

the statement unless believing

it

to be true.

A

would

statement

24.t

See Workshop Papers on the Reform of the Evidence Act, supra note 55, 66-67

^"^

See Section 36 of the Draft Evidence Decree

83
tending to expose the declarant to criminal
exculpate the accused

is

liability

and offered

to

not admissible unless corroborating circumstances

clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

In addition to the general requirement of unavailability, applicable to

exceptions,

some foundational elements must be

interest exception. First, the declarant

However,

it

seems

this

requirement

all

Rule 804

established for the statement against

must have had personal knowledge of the

may

be qualified

The most important foundational requirement, and by

if

multiple hearsay

is

applicable.

most controversial,

far the

fact.^''^

is

that

the statement must be against any of the stated interests of the declarant."''^ These are

pecuniary, proprietary or penaP^^ interests. Apparently,

it

is

believed that these are

important interests with which persons would not toy unless the statements are true.

Although the

rule

is silent

on mixed statements,

and self serving or neutral
academic^'*''

opinion

is

at

the

same time,

i.e

statements that are both disserving

the preponderance of judicial^"* and

that the court should scrutinize such statements

and exclude those

parts that are not against interest or are merely collateral to the parts against interest.

Where

the statement exculpates an accused

person,

it

must be corroborated before

it

is

admissible.^^°

^''^

246

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209

at

1 1 1

j^

'"'

United States v Thomas, 571 F.2d 285 (5th

Cir.

^''

United States v Seyfried, 435 F.2d 696 (7th

Cir. 1971);

1978)

United States v Lilley, 581 F.2d

182 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v Porter, 881 F.2d 878 (10 Cir. 1989);

Williamson v United States,
^"^

14 S.Ct.2431 (1994)

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 198
Rules

'''

1

FRE

804

at

1

On Statements Against Interest,

(b) (3)

M. Martin, The Supreme Court
Touro L. Rev 179 (1994)

120; Michael
1 1

S4

A
and

one feature

this is

distinction

statement against interest can be admitted in favor of or against a party
that distinguishes

admission

is that

is

it

from

its

look alike

non hearsay whereas statement against

admissible hearsay.^^^ Besides, admission must be

made by

the time of litigation whereas, a statement against interest
case,

reliability

is

usually

made between

a choice has to be

background
interest

all

his hearsay evidence

is

it

true,

the

law opts

to

fill

and no evidence

the

make

vacuum,

unavailability of the declarant, with his hearsay statement

is

in

both

unavailable,

at all.

Against the

a statement against his

that

which

prior to the

founded

is

Rule 804 exceptions, since the declarant

that self interest dictates that a person will not

unless

made

in the case.^"

rationale for admissibility of such statements

and necessity. Like

merely

interest is

a party to the proceeding at

by an out of court declarant who would have been a witness

The

admission. ^^' Another

-

in the

is

created by

the

circumstance has a

reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness.'^''

The Nigerian equivalent of

the exception for statement against interest

contained in section 33(c) of the Evidence Act which provides

Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts

dead are themselves relevant

made by

who is
when the

a person

facts in the following cases:

(

c

)

against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person

statement

is

making

and the said person had peculiar means of knowing the matter

it

and had no

251

that:

interest to misrepresent

Glen Weissenberger, supra note

1

98

at

it.

1117

2" Id
253

Id.

2'"

See also

CARLSON. IMWINKELRIED AND KIONKA,

Glen Weissenberger, Supra note 198
KIONKA, supra note 24

at

Supra note 24

CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND

is

as

The only allowable
with

the

Federal

situation

Rule

of unavailability for

of Evidence

this

804(b)(3)

exception

is

death. This contrasts

which admits of other forms of

unavailability. Furthermore, Section 33(c) retains the

common law

limitation of this

exception to statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests, thereby excluding
statements which expose the declarants to criminal

liability.

This limitation, which was

severely criticized'^^ and has been abandoned in the United States, lacks justification.
strange

how

a casual statement admitting liability for a debt

is

more

It is

reliable than

an

admission, or in fact a confession, of guilt to a criminal offense. Happily, in addition to

expanding the scope of unavailability, the Draft Evidence Decree abandons

dichotomy and widens the scope of the exception

to

this arbitrary

cover statements exposing the

declarant to penal liability.

The express requirement, under
had a peculiar means of knowing the matter
markedly from the basic evidentiary

to

section 33 (c), for the declarant to have

which

his statement relates does not differ

both jurisdictions, that a witness generally

rule, in

should have personal knowledge of the matter to which he

testifies.

This

is

of course

subject to the exceptions relating to hearsay. Similarly, while Rule 804 (b)(3) does not

expressely stipulate a requirement that the declarant must have had no interest to
misrepresent, as does section 33(c) of the Nigerian Act, a holistic reading of the rule

operates to mandate a like requirement.

By

the objective test of whether "a reasonable

person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
to

be true," the rule obliges the court to look into the circumstances and context in which

the statement

was

the declarant

had other

2" 5

made.^^^ This will compel the exclusion of statements against interest if
ulterior

motives than the seeming concession.

J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, SS 1401-14
(Chadboum ed. 1974); E. CLEARLY, supra note 223, S 278, at 674; Morgan,
Declarations Against Interest, 5 Vand.

^^^

it

Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209

at

1

L Rev.

121.

451, 472 (1952).

86

F.

Other Exceptions

The remaining

specific exception under Rule 804, statement of personal or family history,

The

also has a counterpart under Nigerian law.'"

804

it is

is

that unlike

Rule

common

Section 33 (e) of the Nigerian Evidence Act retains the

(b) (4),

restriction,

significant difference

of the exception, to statements made before the question, in relation

law

to

which

Mention must also be made of the residual exceptions contained

in the

to be proved,

had

arisen.

Federal Rules of Evidence.'^*

Two

such exceptions

exist.

They

are similar except that

one^^^ does not require proof of unavailability while the other^'"" does.

The

rules admit

statements not specifically covered by any of the enumerated specific exceptions to the

hearsay

However,

rule.

must

statements

the

have

circumstantial

guarantees

of

trustworthiness equivalent to those possessed by the enumerated exceptions and the court

must determine

that (A) the statement is offered as evidence

more probative on

which

the point for

it

is

proponent can procure through reasonable
rules

and the

interest

fact;

offered than any other evidence

efforts;

(B)

advance notice of his intention
the statement including the

which the

and (C) the general purposes of the

is

required to give, the adverse party,

to offer the statement in evidence

name and

residual

and the particulars of

address of the declarant.

exceptions are traced to the case of Dallas

Commercial Union Association

Co,^^^

where the Fifth Circuit held

County v

that a fifty years old

^" See Section 33 (e) of the Nigerian Evidence Act.
'''

FRE

803 (24) and

'"

FRE

803 (24).

''°

FRE

804

261

286

F.

FRE

804

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

2d 388 (5th

it is

of justice will best be served by the admission of the statement into

evidence. Moreover, the proponent of the statement

The

of a material

Cir. 1961);

See also James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay

87

newspaper

article,

which did not

fit

in

any recognised hearsay exception, but which

possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, could be admitted.

When
was

the Federal Rules of Evidence were to be drafted, the decision in Dallas

codified in the form of the residual exceptions.

between the need
flexibility.

The

County

The adoption was a compromise

for certainty, in the province of evidence,

and the desirable need for

on

residual exceptions are sufficiently flexible to enable courts to decide,

a case by case basis, the admissibility of statements not fitting any particular hearsay
exception. At the

same time some mandatory guidelines

are given.

of the five foundational requirements which must be met. The
that the statement

first

These are

in the nature

and most important

must possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness

is

that are

equivalent to those of the specific exceptions. Certain courts interpret this requirement in

terms of the existence of other evidence corroborative of the hearsay statement"^^ while
others focus

more on whether

the circumstances at the time of the

statement provide guarantees of trustworthiness.

Most of

making of

the

^^^

the specific hearsay exceptions are justified

on the basis of the

absence or mitigation of the hearsay dangers. To make a finding that an out of court
statement, not fitting any of the specific exceptions, possesses equivalent circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness, the court should examine the extent to which the hearsay

dangers of faulty perception, faulty memory, ambiguity and insincerity are reduced.

Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 787, 791-794 (1993); Howard S.
Chansanow and Jose Felipe Anderson, The Residual Hearsay Exceptions:
Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U.Bah. L. Rev. 1,9-10 (1994); David A.
Sonesheine, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in
Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U L. Rev. 867, 868 - 871 (1982)

Exception Reconsidered. 20

262

United States v Barnes, 586 F. 2d 1057 (5th

2d 1080 (5th
263

Cir.) cert, denied,

Huff V White Motor Corp. 609

F.

Cir. 1978);

United States v Ward, 552 F

434 U.S. 837 (1977)

2d 286 (7th

Cir. 1979).

See generally Sonesheine,

88

A

controversial question

is

the application of the residual exceptions to

statements which narrowly miss qualification, and admission, under a specific exception.

Some

courts hold that such statements do possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthiness

and therefore admit

them.^^"*

Others rightly hold that the

residual

exceptions are not to be used to circumvent the requirements of the specific exceptions,

and therefore reject such statements. ^^^

It is

an accepted rule of interpretation that specific

provisions override the general ones. Thus if a statement can be considered under a
specific exception but does not pass the test of admissibility under that specific exception,

it

should not be admitted through a residual exception.

To do

otherwise

is

to subvert the

bases for the specific exceptions.

The second requirement
that the statement

must be offered

to

for admissibility,

prove a material

the rule of relevancy. Thirdly, the statement

which
entails

it

is

under the residual exceptions,
This

fact.

is like

is

a restatement of

must be more probative on the

point, for

offered, than any other evidence reasonably available to the proponent. This

two elements. In the

first

place, the proponent

greater tendency, in logic, to establish the fact for

available evidence. '^^ Secondly, he must

obtain another evidence

The

show

more probative than

that

must show

which

it

is

that the statement has

offered, than any other

he could not, with reasonable

efforts,

the statement.^^^

fourth foundational requirement

is

that

it

must be shown

that the

general purpose of the rules, and the interests of justice will be best served by admitting

^'^

United States

^^^

Zenith Radio Corp.

542 F.2d 285, (5th Cir.) rehearing denied, 545 F. 2d 168
(1976); United States v McPartlin, 595 F. 2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) cert, denied,
444 U.S. 833(1980)
v.

Leslie,

V

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505

1980)
^^^

Sonesheine, supra note 261

267

Id,

893

-

894

at

890

F.

Supp.l 190 (E.D. Pa.

89

the statement.

It

appears this requirement

is

an invitation to the court to consider

the

all

circumstances, on a case by case basis, and to balance the competing interests as best

it

can.

Finally there

a requirement of notice. According to Federal Rules of

is

Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the proponent must give sufficient notice
opponent, in advance of

trial

to

or hearing, so as to enable the latter to have a fair

oppurtunit>' to prepare to

meet the hearsay statement. Although the language of the

suggests advance notice,

some

even

in the

course of

trial,

the

rules

courts apply a liberal interpretation to permit notice given

provided the opponent gets a continuance in order to

adequately prepare to meet the statement.^^* There are however some which apply the

requirement of notice
legislative intent

strictly.'*''^

A

strict

interpretation

would

frustrate

the obvious

behind the requirement of notice. The paramount consideration

is

the

provision of adequate oppurtunity for the opponent to prepare to meet the hearsay
statement.

Even where

pre-trial notice is not given, the grant

of a continuance will meet

that need.

There are no provisions under the Nigerian Evidence Act comparable to
the residual exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The

nearest

is

the general

provision in Section 6 (a) empowering the court to exclude evidence of facts which

though relevant or deemed
material in

all

to

be relevant to the issue, appears to

the circumstances of the case. Yet, there

is

it

to

be too remote to be

no correspondence between

provision and the residual exceptions. The provision applies to

all

this

types of evidence

unlike the residual exceptions which apply only to hearsay evidence. Besides, the

provision authorises rejection of otherwise admissible evidence whereas the residuals

^''

United States

v.

Carlson. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976),

(1977); Furtado
'"'

United States

v.

v.

cert,

Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979)

Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1977)

denied, 431 U.S.914
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authorise admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence.

It

can be safely asserted that

while Nigerian law on hearsay appears to track United States law, the residual exceptions
represent a

marked

distinction

between both jurisdictions.
exceptions to the hearsay rule in both countries. ^^° The

There are other

few exceptions considered above

'^"

are the very popular

and more recurring ones.

For the United States these are absence of records kept in accordance with the
provisions of FRE 803 (6)

Absence of public record
organizations

(FRE 803

(11)); Marriage, baptismal,

803(12)); family records
interest in property
in property

Market

(FRE

reports,

(FRE 803 (7)); Records of vital statistics (FRE
or entry (FRE 803 (10)); Records of religious

(FRE

(FRE

and similar

Judgment as

803(15)); Statements in ancient documents

(FRE

803(16));

commercial publications (FRE 803(17)); Learned Treatises (FRE

(FRE

(FRE

(FRE

803(19));

803(20)); Reputation

(FRE 803(22));
boundaries (FRE 803(23)).

803(21)); Judgment of previous conviction

to personal, family, or general history, or

are,

(FRE

803(14)); Statements in documents affecting an interest

803(18)); Reputation concerning personal or family history

For Nigeria these

certificates

803(13)); Records of documents affecting an

Reputation concerning boundaries or general history
as to character

803(9));

admissions and confessions sections (19

-

32 Evidence Act);

Declarations as to public and general rights (Section 33(d)); pedigree declarations
(Section 33(e)); declaration by testators (Section 33(f)); judgments (Sections 49
56); affidavits (Section 78)).

-

CONCLUSION

This discourse reveals that hearsay evidence
States
its

and

in Nigeria.

The

the

maintenance of the

minor

rule,

common

in the

United

one jurisdiction corresponds

variations, like the absence

of jury

to

trials

rendering hearsay evidence inadmissible,

proceeds from the same bases. This similarity

founded on the

viewed with similar concern

definition of the concept in the

definition in the other, and except for

in Nigeria,

is

is

hardly surprising. Both jurisdictions are

law, of which the rule against hearsay evidence

is

a

common

feature.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between the operation of the
rule in the

two jurisdictions. While the

rule has received

treatment in Federal Rules of Evidence 801-805,
crafted

from

terse provisions in the Nigerian

it is still

is

all

a matter of judicial construction

Evidence Act. The result

practically implausible, issue whether the hearsay rule

demonstrated that

an almost exhaustive legislative

is

is

the acdemic, but

part of Nigerian law.

The paper

concerned regard the rule as part of lex Nigeriana. However, there

urgent need for a fuller legislative treatment of the of rule. The United States model,

which contains

specific provisions

definition to exceptions to the rule,

of Evidence provisions on hearsay

on various aspects of hearsay, ranging from

may
is

provide guidance. The merit of the Federal Rules

the concentration

confusion between hearsay and relevancy, although
the Nigerian version of the rule

is

its

by implication,

it

this

on statements. This reduces the

does not totally eliminate
confusion

is

ever present.

it.

Since

Some

of

the exceptions, considered in this work, are couched in the language of relevancy. Yet the

law maintains a distinction between relevancy and admissibility. The former deals with

what need

to

be proved and the

latter

with the means of proving

91

facts.

While relevancy

is

92

a

condition

precedent

the

admissibility,

to

more of

rule

of

which has taken cognizance of

this

hearsay

rule

is

a

inadmissibility.

The paper noted
point.

current reform effort

Law Reform Commission,

However, the approach of the

as

shown

provisions of the Draft Evidence Decree, to which the paper alluded,
satisfactory.
in the

The

definition of hearsay

language of relevancy.

is

hoped

It is

is

not clear enough. The exceptions are
that the

Commission

far

still

will, in its further

in

the

from

drafted

review of

the draft, take care of these details. In doing so reference to the structure of the United
States Federal Rules of Evidence

An
the
rule

may prove

inescapable point to be

helpful.

made about

unwholesome pervasiveness of the exceptions
which admits of twenty nine exceptions

some regard

the rule as a fiction.

The extensiveness of

Some of

is

the Federal Rules of Evidence

is

to the rule against hearsay evidence.

A

akin to being non existent.

the exceptions overlap and

No wonder

may be merged.

the exceptions appears an unwieldy compromise.

None of

the

leading reform proposals'^' contests the necessity for a rule restricting the admissibility of
hearsay. Against this backdrop, and in view of the several rationales discussed in the

work, what

is

required

is

a re-invention of the rule. Existing doctrine

statements can be admitted under the expansive exceptions. That
hearsay."^''

There

271 Eleanor Swift,

is

need

to

is if

loose.

is

Most

they qualify as

streamline the exceptions. Otherwise the issue really

A Foundation Fact Approach

to

Hearsay, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1339

(1987) (suggesting that hearsay be admissible
foundation facts enabling the

trier

is

if the

proponent presents

of facts to intelligently evaluate

it);

Park, supra

note 89 (suggesting the liberalization of hearsay in civil cases while retaining the
rule against hearsay in criminal cases); Seigel, supra note

hearsay be admissible

ADVOCACY, 48

if

it

is

the best evidence); C. A.

70 (suggesting that

OPUTA,

MODERN BAR

(1982) (suggesting that hearsay be admissible from defence but

not from prosecutor)
272 Professor Fenner concludes that everything can be nonhearsay and everything can

come under

the exceptions. See Fenner, supra note 17, 10-36.

that judicial practice further erodes the rule.

Rule at Work: Has

it

See

Myma S.

Some

also maintain

Raeder, The Hearsay

been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 Minn.

93

whether there
be, that

is

is

a rule against hearsay, and, if not, whether one

is

needed.

To be

or not to

the hard question!

507 (1992) and contrast with Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work:
been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473

L. Rev.

Has

it

(1992).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

T.

AKINOLA AGUDA, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, (3

RONALD

ALLEN AND RICHARD B. KUHNS,

J.

EVIDENCE,

RONALD
KIONKA,

FEDERAL RULES OF

(1991)

CARLSON, EDWARD

L.

1991

rd ed 1989)

J.

IMWINKELRIED AND EDWARD

EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, CASES AND MATERIALS,

(3 rd

J.

ed

1991)
C.

CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE,
T.O. ELI AS,

(3 rd

ed 1984)

(1970)

THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM,

(2d ed 1963)

MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE,

(4 th ed 1996)

MICHAEL GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT, VOLUME
R.

LEMPERT AND

S.

1

(1989)

SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE

(

2 d

ed 1982)

MICHAEL M. MARTIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE,

(

6 th ed 1988)

EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION, (1956)
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD
FIDELIS
A.O.
C.

KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE,

NWADIALO, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE,

OBILADE, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM,

O.

C. A.

A.E.

C.

(1981)

(1979)

OKONKWO (ed), INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN LAW
OPUTA,

MODERN BAR ADVOCACY, (1982)

W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW,
94

(1963)

(1995)

95

PHIPSON'S

LAW OF EVIDENCE, (10 th ed)

PAUL ROSTHEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS

AND MAGISTRATES, (2 d ed
PAUL

1979)

COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

RICE, EVIDENCE:

(3rdedl996)
G.R.

RUDD, THE NIGERIAN

STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF

LAW OF EVIDENCE, (1964)

LAW OF EVIDENCE

JACK B. WEINSTEIN ANDMARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,

GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,

WIGMORE EVIDENCE, (CHADBOURNE REV

5

J.

6

WIGMORE EVIDENCE

JOHN WILLIAM STRONG

(ed)

(1987)

1974)

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE

IRVING

THICKET,(1988)

ARTICLES
Ronald Allen, The Evolution of Hearsay

to

a Rule ofAdmission, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 797

(1992)

Law Azubuike, Proposals for the Reform of the

Evidence Act, in

WORKSHOP PAPERS

ON THE REFORM OF THE EVIDENCE ACT,(Nigerian Law Reform
Commission

(ed)

1995)

James E. Beaver, The Residual Exception Reconsidered, 20

Fla. St.

U. L. Rev. 787

(1993)

Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 43 (1994)

Howard

S.

Chansanow and Jose

Felipe Anderson, The Residual Exceptions: Maryland's

Lukewarm Welcome, 24

Bait. L.

Rev. 1(1994)

96

Michael Fenner,

Law Professor Reveals Shocking

Rev.

1

Truth About Hearsay, 62 U.M.K.C.

L

(1993)

Stanley Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a "Firmly Rooted"

Exception to the hearsay Rule, 23 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 453 (1990)
Hart and McNaugton,

Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference

EVIDENCE AND

in the

INFERENCE, 56 (LERNER

Law,

ed 1958)

Rick A. Howard, Hearsay Exceptions- The Dying Declaration: Return
Application, 19

Am.

J.

Trial

in

to its

Original

Advoc. 481 (1995)

Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the

Law of Evidence,

28 Colum. L. Rev.

432(1928)

Edward

J.

Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to which the
Fifth

and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require

Hearsay Rules, 76 Minn.

Awa U.

L.

the Liberalization

of

Rev. 521 (1992)

Kalu, Reform of the Evidence Law, in

WORKSHOP PAPERS ON THE

REFORM OF THE EVIDENCE ACT (Nigerian Law Reform
Commissioned, 1995)
Mortimer R. Kaddish and Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8

Law and

Phil.

332(1989)
Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park and Steven Penrod, Jurors Perception of Eye
'

Witness

Kenneth

and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.

L. Rev.

E. Kraus, The Recent Perception Exception to the

703 (1992)

Hearsay Rule: A

Justifiable

Track Record, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1525 (1985)
Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 741
(1961)

Michael M. Martin, The Supreme Court Rules on Statement Against

Interest,

Rev. 179(1994)
Charles McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 Yale L.

J.

489 (1930)

1 1

Touro

L.

97

Charles McCormick, The

New Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, 20

Tex.

L. Rev. 661 (1942)

Peter Mierine, Roger C. Park and

Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the

Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992)
Paul Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting Over,
71 Or. L. Rev. 723(1992)

James Mooorehead, Compromising
Reliability,

Edmund Morgan,

the

Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae

29 Loy. A. L. Rev. 203 (1995)

Declarations Against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952)

Edmund Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Harv. L. Rev.

Edmund Morgan, Res

Concept, 62

177(1948)

Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 91 (1937)

Mary Morton, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide, 74 Geo.
Christopher Mueller, Post

L.

J.

1301 (1986)

Modern Hearsay: The Importance of Complexity, 76 Minn.

L.

Rev. 367(1992)
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event:
Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev.

On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of

1357 (1985)

Aviva Orenstein, "My God": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception
the

Yemi

Hearsay Rule, 85

Osibajo, The

Common Law,

Calif. L.

Rev. 159 (1997)

the Evidence Act

and Interpretation of Section

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE ELIAS
Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach

to

to

(J.A.

5(a), in

OMOTOLA ed)

Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev.

5

(1987)

Roger C. Park, I Didn

't

Tell

Them Anything About You: Implied Assertions as Hearsay

under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783 (1990)

Roger C. Park, The Hearsay Rule and the

Stability

of verdicts: A Response

Nesson, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1057 (1986)

to

Professor

98

William G. Passannanta, Res Gestae, the Present Sense Impression and Extrinsic
Corroboration under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and
Counterparts, 17 Fordham Urb. L.

Myma S.

State

89 (1988/1989)

J.

A

Quick, Hearsay, Excitement and the Uniform Rules:
L. Rev.

its

Reappraisal of Rule 63(3),

Wayne

204(1960)

Has

Raeder, The Hearsay Rule at Work:

it

been Abolished De Facto by Judicial

Discretion?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 507 (1992)

Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 Litig. 13

Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay:

A

Proposal for A Best Evidence Hearsay Rule,

72B.U.L. Rev. 893(1992)
David A. Sonesheine, The Residual Exceptions

to the

Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions

in

Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 867 (1982)
Eleanor Swift,

A Foundation Fact Approach

to

Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has

Hearsay, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1339 (1987)
it

been Abolished De Facto by Judicial

Decision?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473 (1992)
Peter Tillers and David

Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 Minn.

L. Rev.

813 (1992)

Laurence Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
Olin

Guy Wellborn

111, The Definition

of Hearsay

in

Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 Tex.

L. Rev. 49 (!982)

Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an
Unavailable

Declarant, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1079 (1987)

Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Rule 803(3), 64 Temp. L.
Rev. 143 (1991)

Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 Ohio
(1996)

St. L. J.

1525

r
^fi \0

S'O
!

iAr

/.

,.

b-

Ill
3 aiOfi DSflSM Sflbl

